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ABSTRACT: This article undertakes a normative and empirical legal inquiry into the manner 
information security vulnerabilities are being addressed through law and in the marketplace. Specifically, 
this article questions the current legislative paradigm for information security regulation by presenting a 
critique grounded in information security and cryptography theory.  Consequently, this article advocates 
shifting our regulatory approach to a process-based security paradigm that focuses on improving security 
of our system as a whole.  Finally, this article argues that in order to accomplish this shift with least 
disruption to current legal and economic processes, expanding an existing set of well-functioning legal 
structures is preferable to crafting new legal structures.  Securities disclosure law is already focused on 
regulating the most connected points in our economy, publicly traded entities. Public companies provide a 
good starting point for spreading better information security behaviors because of this connectedness; 
disclosure of public companies’ information security behaviors will assist them in maximizing 
shareholder value and will assist regulators in finding the inadequately secure points in our economy.
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Introduction
Our society currently sits at an information control crossroads.  Advances in information 
technology have fundamentally altered the business environment2 and created a marketplace 
suffering from a data control paradox:   on the one hand, aggregation and commercial leveraging 
of data is easier than ever before, and, on the other hand, protecting proprietary information is 
becoming more difficult.3   This data control paradox impacts both corporate entities and 
consumers.  Personally identifiable information can simultaneously be conceptualized as both an 
2
 For a discussion of the manner in which new technologies have fundamentally transformed traditional 
business processes see, e.g., Carolita Oliveros, Overview of Global Internet Distribution Laws, SJ075 ALI-ABA 579 
(2004) (discussing international product distribution and marketing transformation in business as a result of the 
internet).
3
 For example, in the first quarter of 2005, at least two major data control failures have already occurred – the 
compromise of as many as 170,000 consumers’ data by data aggregators ChoicePoint, Inc. and LexisNexis, as well 
as the loss of tapes with 1.2 million federal employees’ information by Bank of America. See, e.g., Choicepoint Says 
It’s Sorry, WIRED, March 15, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66912,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_3
(last visited March 15, 2005); Kim Zetter, California Woman Sues ChoicePoint, WIRED, February 25, 2005, 
available at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66710,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_3 (last visited March 1, 
2005); Kim Zetter, ID Theft Victims Could Lose Twice, WIRED, February 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66685,00.html (last visited March 1, 2005).  For a discussion of the 
Bank of America incident see, e.g., Paul Newell, Bank of America Says Tapes with Customer Data Lost, 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, February 28, 2005, available at
http://wwwnl.technologyreview.com/t?ctl=BE60DD:2EDABCF (last visited March 1, 2005).
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
5
individual consumer’s information property,4 and, if collected with consent of the consumer, an 
entity’s intangible asset, which can be sold in the marketplace. Consequently, the issues raised 
by information security cut across all levels of social ecology.
Within the last five years, numerous data control statutes have been passed by Congress, 
including the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act,5 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,6 the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,7 and the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act.8  Through these statutes, Congress has articulated a 
clear social directive to business entities to improve information security.  Despite this 
Congressional action, however, information vulnerability9 is reaching crisis levels within our 
society and brings with it high long-run social costs.10
Both corporate entities and consumers have contributed to widespread information 
vulnerability. This article focuses on the first of these two sources, corporate entities,11 and 
undertakes a normative and empirical legal inquiry into the manner in which information 
security vulnerability is being addressed through law and the marketplace. Specifically, this 
article questions the current legislative paradigm for information security regulation by 
4
 For a discussion of the transformation of user data into a marketable commodity and the appropriateness of 
intellectual property or tort remedies, see, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000).  
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506. COPPA applies to Web sites or online services that are operated for commercial 
purposes. Id.  at § 6501(2).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827, GLBA governs the privacy protections for customer information of financial 
institutions.
7 P.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), privacy provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1320d-8. HIPAA 
governs health information held by health plans, health care clearinghouses, or health care providers who transmit 
any health information in electronic form in connection with a covered transaction.
8
 CAN-SPAM is the acronym commonly used for the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography 
and Marketing Act. P.L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2004).
9
 As used in this article, information or security vulnerability refers to any deficiency in security which may 
result in an online or offline breach or unauthorized access of data, including any use of corporate or consumer 
computer systems for malicious activity by internal or external forces and any related event, malicious or accidental, 
which results in damages or losses to a company or consumer such as a virus or worm. 
10
 One visible manifestation of this widespread vulnerability is the current epidemic of phishing attacks which 
simultaneously damage the corporate goodwill of the entities impersonated as well as damaging consumers through 
stealing their personally identifiable information.  Simply put, phishing is luring a user to a replica of an existing 
website to trick a user into submitting personal, financial, or password data.  See, e.g., Antiphishing Working Group 
at http://www.antiphishing.org (last visited November 23, 2004); WordSpy at
http://www.wordspy.com/words/phishing.asp (last visited November 23, 2004).
11
   The focus of this article is on corporate education and development in information security because 
improving the state of corporate information security will generate a more potent effect in diminishing information 
crime.  Corporations are aggregators of consumer data, allowing many consumers to be harmed at once in data 
breaches. Similarly, corporations are investments of many shareholders, therefore corporate information damage 
financially impacts shareholders as well as the entity.  Consumer education is a critical part of improving 
information security but will ;take a longer period of time than improving security of business entities.
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presenting a critique grounded in information security and cryptography theory.  This article next
questions whether a correction to the current legal paradigm is necessary or whether market 
forces are correcting for the legislative deficiency.  It analyzes the current business paradigm of 
information security risk management by conducting an empirical analysis of the information 
security disclosure practices of publicly traded companies.  Results of these analyses indicate 
that business entities, like Congress, have adopted the suboptimal security paradigm known as 
“security through obscurity.” These results cast doubt on whether information risk is being 
incorporated into corporate and shareholder decisionmaking and whether information security 
learning is emerging in our society.  
Consequently, this article advocates shifting our regulatory approach from a “security 
through obscurity” paradigm to a process-based security paradigm that focuses on improving 
security of our system as a whole and facilitates entities’ information security learning.  In order 
to accomplish this shift with least disruption to current processes, expanding an existing set of 
well-functioning structures is preferable to crafting new legal structures. Specifically, securities 
disclosure regulation is already focused on regulating the most connected points in our economy,
publicly traded entities. Therefore, public companies provide a good starting point for spreading 
better information security behaviors through the economy.
Section I of this article introduces the information security crisis faced by business 
entities and consumers.  Section I also discusses current legislative approaches to raise social and 
corporate awareness of the importance of information security.  In the last ten years Congress has 
articulated a new social policy directive to corporate entities to improve information security.  
Section II examines how this directive is being incorporated into the complex system of 
our economy.  This section argues that the paradigm adopted by current information security 
regulation is suboptimal:  known in information security and cryptography theory as “security 
through obscurity,” it is considered inferior to a security paradigm predicated on Kerckhoff’s 
Law or “security through process.”  Consequently, Section II advocates legislatively shifting 
toward a “security through process” paradigm in which the security of information throughout 
the economy must be analyzed as a whole, looking for the weakest points of security and 
focusing on raising the average level of security throughout the system.  Section II also conducts 
an inquiry into the information security behaviors of the “hubs” in our economy, publicly traded 
entities, as disclosed in their securities filings, to analyze whether, despite a suboptimal 
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legislative paradigm, hubs’ information security behavior already evidences the paradigm of 
“security through process.” If hubs are already incorporating a “security through process”
paradigm, then, arguably, regardless of the legislative approach, security learning may be 
spreading through our economy and legislative correction is unnecessary.  An empirical
longitudinal analysis of 120 publicly traded companies’ 10K annual securities filings across five
years time was conducted to assess the extent of information security disclosure, and, 
consequently, to derive the security paradigm adopted by these entities.  Less than half of the 
sample engaged in any information security disclosures in their most recent 10K filings.  Of 
those entities in the sample who disclosed,12 the entities tended to (1) have disclosed information 
security risks in their filings five years ago, (2) be technology companies, and (3) have been 
prosecuted for data breaches.  Section II concludes that the entities in the sample, like current 
legislation, are also adopting the inferior paradigm of “security through obscurity” and that 
information security learning is not emerging as quickly as needed in publicly traded entities.
Because of the severity of the information security crisis, entities appear to need legal 
scaffolding13 to expedite their development toward a model of “security through process.”  This 
shift will facilitate information security learning that will assist entities in both improving long-
term value creation for shareholders and lessening their contribution to the information security 
crisis.
Section III of this article proposes one type of legal scaffolding that may facilitate 
emergence of corporate information security learning.  Specifically, Section III proposes a 
feedback mechanism theoretically grounded in the cybernetics theory14 concepts of 
communication, control and system and uses securities regulation to generate an autocatalytic 
12
 These “most recent” 10K filings used were the last 10K filings of the entities in the sample as of August 
2004. 10K’s are the most important annual shareholder communication and are intended to present shareholders 
with a thumbnail sketch of the activities of the entity during the year through the eyes of management.
13
 Scaffolding is an education theory term which refers to assisting an individual’s learning through giving them 
as little assistance as possible while at the same time ensuring their success.  Therefore, the key is to let the learner
teach herself while monitoring her progress and providing only as much redirection and correction as needed to keep 
the learner’s progress on target.  See, e.g., Irina Verenikina, Understanding Scaffolding and the ZPD in Education 
Theory, available at http://www.aare.edu.au/03pap/ver03682.pdf (last visited January 17, 2005).  In effect, 
traditional Socratic teaching methodology, if used correctly is an example of scaffolding in action – a professor 
assists the student to teach herself.
14
 For a definition of and discussion of cybernetics see, e.g., American Society for Cybernetics, available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~asc/cyber_definition.html (last visited January 17, 2005); NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS 
OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (1948); A.Y. AULIN, CYBERNETIC LAWS OF 
SOCIAL PROGRESS (1982).
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set15 of self-sustaining good corporate information security behaviors that will ultimately result 
in better shareholder oversight of corporate activity.  The results of this oversight will include 
systemic improvements in corporate information security and better assurance that corporate
information vulnerability, security losses and diminution of intangible asset value are being 
correctly factored into stock price of vulnerable entities. A positive externality of such improved 
corporate security may be that some of these new information security lessons and behaviors will 
be transferred by employees into their personal behaviors, improving the consumer end of the 
information security crisis.
I. The Information Security Crisis
During the last decade, our society has undergone an information control revolution
driven by technology-mediated networks.  The business environment within our society has been 
dramatically altered; information technology is becoming integral to corporate governance and 
operations.16 Business communications have progressively shifted from real space to virtual 
space,17 and entirely new technology-contingent businesses have arisen, such as eBay and 
Google.18 19 As the digital divide20 in the United States closes,21 business and consumers are 
15
 An autocatalytic set is a group of elements that work together to generate a product that itself becomes the 
stimulus for the reaction which generates the next generation product.  For a discussion of autocatalysis see, e.g., 
STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995).
16
  For example, most law firms use document management systems to centralize work product. For a 
discussion of document management software see, e.g., Dennis Kennedy, John Gelagin, Want to Save 16 Minutes 
Every Day?, FINDLAW, February 2003, at http://practice.findlaw.com/archives/worldbeat_0203.html (last visited 
March 15, 2005). This use of information technology serves to facilitate knowledge management, sharing of 
institutional intellectual resources such as form contracts and control over access to certain information.
17Ed Frauenheim, Report: E-mail volume grows rapidly, CNET, October 2, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/2110-1032-5085956.html?tag=3Dnefd_hed  (last visited November 23, 2004). 
18 See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Website Terms of Use Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 499, 508 (2003). 
19
 As a consequence of this transformation, numerous state corporate statutes have been amended to allow for 
email notice, virtual shareholder meetings, and internet proxy voting. See, e.g., Gary W. Derrick, Irving L. Faught, 
New Developments in Oklahoma Business Entity Law, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 259, 263-265 (2003). See also, e.g., Robert 
C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporation Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95(2003).
20
  The term “digital divide” has been used by academics and policymakers to describe the gap that exists within 
and across countries between information technology “haves” and “have-nots,” i.e. those individuals and groups 
with access to information technology, specifically the Internet, and those individuals without such access.  For a 
discussion of the digital divide, its contours and its relationship to corporate information technology production see, 
e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: Information Technology Equity, the Digital Divide and the Gender 
Gap among Information Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v2/n1/2 (last visited November 26, 2004).
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adopting new technologies in their purchasing behaviors22 and view purchasing goods through 
the Web as a routine part of life.23 As a result of this successful incorporation of network-
mediated information technology into corporate and consumer economic behaviors,24 our society 
now faces an information security crisis.
A. The Problem
As information technology has been incorporated into corporate practices and consumer 
economic behaviors, a new economic environment has emerged, an environment where 
corporate and consumer data collection, aggregation, and leveraging is prevalent.  Corporate 
proprietary information and personally identifiable consumer data collected by entities is now
centralized into networked databases, “hubs” of information within business entities.25
Consequently, society is experiencing new types of harms related to failures in information 
control and security.26
Negative consequences resulting from weak information security detrimentally impact
each level of social ecology and result in three types of harms: confidentiality harms, integrity 
harms, and availability harms.  On the macrosystem/societal level,27 fraud resulting from 
information harms generates billions of dollars of economic losses in the aggregate and burdens
21
  Progress toward universal access is being achieved.  Between 1994 and 1998, the number of Americans 
owning computers increased by over fifty percent, and the number of households using e-mail quadrupled. Between 
December 1998 and July 2000, the percentage of households with Internet access increased by fifty-eight percent.  
Over half of all households had computers by July 2000, and individuals using the Internet rose by a third. See U.S. 
DEP.T OF COMMERCE, NAT.L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW 
DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (Jul. 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/falling.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
22
 For a discussion of consumer technology adoption see, e.g.,  Richard Trinkner with Brian Smith, Consumer 
Technology Adoption Roadmap, GARTNER, available at http://www.gartnerg2.com/site/FileDownload.asp?file=wp-
0902-0002.pdf (last visited October 9, 2004).
23 See, e.g., National Statistics UK, More Businesses Are Buying Over the Internet, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/e-com1104.pdf (last visited November 26, 2004).
24
 For a discussion of consequences of technological adoption and the values embodied therein, see, e.g., 
EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1995) (discussing the consequences of innovations and examining 
the value implications of different innovations, arguing that  technologies need to be critically evaluated from 
utilitarian and moral perspectives before being adopted). 
25 See, e.g., ALBERTO LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2002).
26
 In particular, these harms include malicious or unwanted information collection by third parties.
27
 Macrosystem level analysis requires examination at the level of culture as a whole, along with belief systems 
and ideologies underlying cultural rules and norms. In other words, the analysis focuses on the mechanisms of social 
governance and the worldview prevalent in civil society. URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT, 258(1979).
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both the marketplace and the legal system.  On the mesosystem/interpersonal28 level, information 
harms erode commercial trust and cause difficulty in commercial communications.   On the 
microsystem/individual level,29 information harms hinder commercial identity development for 
both corporate entities and consumers.
1. Macrosystem:  The Social Costs of Weak Information Security
Our economy has lost billions of dollars to information security harms; in 2003 alone, the 
total social costs of information vulnerability were approximately $60 billion in the United 
States.30 For example, identity theft is widely regarded to be severely underreported,31 and the 
total economic costs of reported incidents identity theft amount to approximately $50 billion per 
year, according to a study commissioned by the Federal Trade Commission.32  On average, each 
act of identity theft results in a loss of $4,800.33
The financial burdens resulting from this harm impact not only individual victims but 
also our economy and society as a whole; they damage the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of certain social resources. For instance, some social structures , such as the social 
security system, are contingent on data confidentiality and security of information.  Compromise 
of individuals’ social security numbers can result in fraud, which then requires expending social 
resources on prosecution and necessitates incurring transaction costs associated with issuing new 
social security numbers to victims and eliminating the old numbers from the social security rolls.  
Similarly, the integrity of social structures, such as the justice system and law enforcement, is
negatively impacted by information crime.  Identity thieves sometimes identify themselves using 
28
 Mesosystem level analysis focuses attention on interpersonal dynamics and the dynamics between individuals 
and secondary settings, such as work. Id. at 209.
29
 On the microsystem level, individuals and their psychological development in a particular context is the 
primary level of analysis. Id. at 109.
30
 Information security crimes usurp large amounts of social resources. The costs of information crime ripple 
through the criminal justice system and other parts of society as well as the economy.   Costs of prosecution and 
incarceration of information criminals must be added to the $60 billion+ total economic losses resulting from these 
information crimes. 
31
 Robert Lemos, Analyst: Crime pays for identity thieves, CNET, July 21, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/Analyst+Crime+pays+for+identity+thieves/2100-1009_3-5050295.html?tag=nl (last visited 
November 26, 2004).
32
  Federal Trade Commission Identity Theft Survey Report, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf (last visited November 26, 2004).
33 Id. 
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a victim’s identity when being charged with a crime.34 Discovering this misidentification of the 
criminal and clearing up the consequential damage to the victim’s record similarly usurps social 
resources of law enforcement.  Finally, availability of social resources, such as work hours used 
for economic production, is also jeopardized by information crime. Workers’ frequently 
repurpose hours from economic activity in the workplace to resolving their personal issues 
resulting from information crime. The value of the time spent by individual victims in resolving 
the consequences of identity theft approaches 300,000,000 hours per year.35  These hours could 
have been devoted to more economic production, purchasing items on the Web or other socially 
beneficial ends.  
2.  Mesosystem:  Weak Security and Burdens on Business Entities
On the mesosystem/interpersonal level, information vulnerability and crime erode
commercial trust between business partners. Corporate entities suffer economic harms and 
reputational damage due to their own or their business partners’ inadequate security practices.
For example, it is estimated by the Federal Trade Commission that U.S. corporations have lost 
approximately $48 billion to identity theft alone between September 2002 and September 2003.36
Confidentiality, integrity and availability of corporate assets are all negatively impacted by 
information vulnerability and crime.  
Certain corporate assets, such as databases of customer information and preferences, are 
valuable only because of their confidentiality.37 One data breach could greatly diminish the 
value of such an intangible asset. 38 For example, the damage that a corporate insider can 
34 Id.  Approximately 15% of identity theft victims’ personal information is fraudulently used in nonfinancial 
ways, particularly in connection with the thief being charged with a crime and passing himself off as the victim. 4 
percent of victims reported that their information was misused in this way.  See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Study: 
Millions hit by ID fraud, CNET, September 3, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/Study+Millions+hit+by+ID+fraud/2100-1029_3-5071060.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last visited 
November 29, 2004).
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., MailFrontier Threat Stats available at http://www.mailfrontier.com/threats/stats.html  ;  FTC 
Releases Survey of Identity Theft in U.S. 27.3 Million Victims in Past 5 Years, Billions in Losses for Businesses 
and Consumers, September 3, 2003, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/idtheft.htm (last visited November 
26, 2004).
37
 For example, Acxiom Corporation derives revenue principally from selling aggregated information.  If this 
information is stolen and becomes available on the information black market cheaply, it is highly unlikely that 
Acxiom will be able to maintain the value of this intangible asset at previous levels.
38
 Benjamin Wright, IT Security Law, available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/meet/04tech_pres/wright.pdf
(last visited November 26, 2004).  In the tax context, entities frequently argue that they should be allowed to 
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generate in one episode of information theft has, in at least one instance, been approximated at 
between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000.39  Similarly, corporate proprietary information 
protected solely by trade secret law could, in effect, lose all value in an information crime 
incident because the information’s status as a trade secret is entirely contingent upon its 
confidentiality.40
Integrity of corporate systems is in jeopardy as a consequence of suboptimal security.
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that in 2000, corporations sustained more than $1.5 trillion in 
losses in one year due to security breaches, including computer viruses.41 Another source of 
corporate integrity losses is diminished brand value and corporate goodwill due to security 
vulnerability. An entity that earns a reputation as a vulnerable entity that breaches promises of 
data care decreases the value of its investments in brand identity building. A brand can become
tainted in the minds of business partners and consumers if it is associated with lax information 
security.42 Finally, some integrity losses are losses related to opportunity costs. For example, 
amortize the value of their customer lists.  See, e.g., The Charles Schwab Corporation and Subsidiaries v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2004 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 10 (2004).
39
 In the biggest incidence of identity theft known to date, a help desk worker at Teledata Communications, Inc., 
which provides credit reports on consumers to lenders, is estimated to have stolen 30,000 consumers’ credit reports 
which he shared with around 20 compatriots who leveraged the data to cause significant financial damage to the 
consumers in question.  He was paid approximately $30 per credit report, or a total of $900,000.   See, e.g., Guilty 
plea in $50 million identity theft, CNN, September 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/14/identity.theft.ap/  (last visited November 26, 2004). See also, Man pleads 
guilty in massive identity theft, CNET, September 15, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/Man+pleads+guilty+in+massive+identity+theft/2100-1029_3-5367658.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb
(last visited November 26, 2004). 
40 It can be argued that any data leakage is demonstrative of inadequate measures to keep the information secret, 
thereby putting it outside the scope of trade secret protection of most states’ trade secret statutes. Trade secret 
statutes vary state by state, but most define a “trade secret” as information that an entity has used due care in 
protecting from disclosure.  If it can be demonstrated that information security practices of an entity were 
suboptimal during any point in the lifetime of the information, it can frequently be successfully argued that the 
information in question is no longer a trade secret.  See, e.g., John T. Soma, Sharon K. Black, Alexander R. Smith, 
Antitrust Pitfalls in Licensing, 449 PLI/Pat 349 (1996) .
41At least 81,000 viruses are known to be in existence today,41 poised to generate even more staggering losses.
Cyber Attacks Target Computer Vulnerabilities, PBS available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/computer_worms/intro.html (last visited November 26, 2004). For example, 
the Blaster worm losses alone approaching $10 million. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Cybersweep, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/cyber/cysweep/cysweep1.htm (last visited November 26, 2004).
42
 One of the newest brandbuilding techniques is the capability for each entity to make its own corporate 
cyborg/avatar to provide a friendly face to internet visitors.  See, e.g., Vhost Sitepal at 
http://www.oddcast.com/sitepal/?promotionId=235&bannerId=128 (last visited November 26, 2004).
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occasionally certain types of vulnerabilities such as name-your-own-price vulnerabilities43
deprive an entity of revenue it would have otherwise received.
For example, phishing44 attempts are one type of attack which presents a particularly 
serious threat to corporate entities’ goodwill. Phishing fraud losses measured approximately 
$500 million and $2.4 billion last year.45 During a phishing attack, an attacker simultaneously 
victimizes both entities and consumers by “spoofing”46 emails to deceive recipients into 
believing that the email originates from a credible source with which the consumer may have a 
trusted commercial relationship, such as a financial services provider.47 Phishing attacks 
frequently included registering domain names that appear to be associated with the targeted 
entity and otherwise infringing on the intellectual property of the targeted entity.  The goal of 
phishing is to leverage the goodwill48 of a trusted services provider and trick consumers into 
revealing personal financial information, usernames, passwords, social security numbers and the 
like.49 Similarly, legitimate email communications from the business entity may be ignored by 
43 See, e.g.,  Brian McWilliams, Name Your Own Price on PayPal, WIRED, April 12, 2002, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51977,00.html?tw=wn_story_related (last visited November 26, 
2004).
44
 The term "phishing" is derived from the idea that internet conartists use email lures to "fish" for passwords 
and other personally identifiable data from the sea of internet users. The letters "ph" are a frequent replacement for 
"f" in hacker language, and most likely reflect an act of verbal homage to the original form of hacking, called 
"phreaking," a term coined by the first hacker, John Draper, "Cap’n Crunch." By 1996, hacked accounts came to be 
known as "phish,” and by 1997 phish were used as currency by hackers in exchange for items such as hacking 
software. See, e.g., Anti-Phishing Working Group at http://www.antiphishing.org/word_phish.html (last visited 
October 9, 2004).  
45Good news: 'Phishing' scams net only $500 million, CNET, September 29, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/Good+news+Phishing+scams+net+ionlyi+500+million/2100-1029_3-5388757.html (last 
visited November 26, 2004); see, also, e.g., Cynthia L. Webb, CEOs Plan a Phish Fry, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 
2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42917-2004Jun15.html (last visited 
November 26, 2004); Gartner Study Finds Significant Increase in E-Mail Phishing Attacks: Cost to U.S. Banks and 
Credit Card Issuers Estimated at $1.2 Billion in 2003 available at 
http://www4.gartner.com/5_about/press_releases/asset_71087_11.jsp (last visited November 26, 2004).
46
 Spoofing is defined as sending a message to make it appear as if it is arriving from someone else. See, e.g., 
Webopedia at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/IP_spoofing.html (last visited November 26, 2004).
47
 The entity whose email is spoofed frequently is Citibank.  For statistics on phishing see, e.g., Antiphishing 
Working Group at  http://www.antiphishing.org (last visited November 26, 2004). For additional discussion of 
phishing see, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Phishing Alert, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm (last visited November 26, 2004); Harry A. Valetk, 
Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 at 
12. 
48
 In particular, phishing attacks usually infringe the trademarks of the spoofed entity as well as the look-and-
feel of the entity’s website.
49 Id. 
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cautious consumers who mistake the legitimate communication for a phishing attack.50 Although 
consumers who are victims of phishing attacks are frequently aware that the entity whose email 
is spoofed is not directly responsible for the phishing attack, nevertheless may the consumer may 
form a negative association with the entity, particularly if the victimized entity does not 
aggressively pursue the attacker.  Thus, phishing presents a severe threat to corporate goodwill as 
well as to consumer information security.
Availability of corporate assets also becomes limited as a consequence of security issues.  
Corporations spent approximately $11 billion addressing spam related issues in 2003.51 For 
example, spam is usurping companies’ server space and worker time.52  In one study, 34% of 
email users said they are less able to communicate effectively at work.53 An attacker also usurps 
availability of an entity’s technological resources during an attempt to remotely compromise a 
network.  Such resources include, among other things, bandwidth and the work hours allocated 
to the attack by the people responding to the incident.  Incident response employee time does not 
end when the attack ends; numerous hours are subsequently logged performing forensic 
examinations, writing incident reports and other recordkeeping obligations.  Finally, if a security 
incident results in a consumer data privacy violation, availability of capital is further diminished 
50
 For example, even a highly technology savvy consumer may have difficulty distinguishing between a 
phishing email and a legitimate commercial communication from an entity with whom the consumer has a 
preexisting relationship.  See, e.g., MailFrontier, Phishing Quiz, available at 
http://survey.mailfrontier.com/survey/quiztest.html (last visited November 26, 2004).  Even the author of this article 
misidentified one of the items in this quiz, identifying it as fraudulent when, in fact, it was legitimate.
51 Id.   By comparison, worldwide losses in the month of October 2003 alone because of spam were 
approximately $10.4 billion, surpassing viruses and worms, which caused $8.4 billion in losses, and hackers who 
caused $1 billion in financial damage.  See Tim Lemke, Spam harmed economy more than hackers, viruses, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, November 9, 2003, available at http://www.washtimes.com/business/20031109-103641-
5567r.htm (last visited November 29, 2004).
52
  It is estimated that by the middle of 2004, spam constituted at least 65% of all email. For example, in the 
experience of at least one entity, the percentage of its inbound email traffic devoted to spam increased to as much as 
75% in 2003 from 8% in 2000, and its costs to combat spam increased 700%.. See Dale W. Malik, BellSouth 
Internet Group, FTC Spam Forum Notes for Economics of Spam Panel, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spam/Presentations/malik.pdf, (last visited January 28, 2004). For most users, 
spam has become such an integral but unwanted part of internet usage that some spam, like the infamous email 
allegedly from the son of an ousted Nigerian dictator has achieved almost a certain cultural status as a communal 
object of abhorrence, even becoming the subject of a museum exhibit.  See, e.g., Heidi Vogy, Spam Exhibit Turns 
Inbox Deluge Into Art, INFORMATION WEEK, January 27, 2004,  available at http://www.informationweek.com (last 
visited November 26, 2004); Michelle Delio, Meet the Nigerian Grifters, WIRED, July 12, 200, available at 
http://www.wired.com (last visited November 26, 2004).  See also Nigerian Letter Scams, Internet Fraud Complaint 
Center, at http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/nls.asp#Example%20#1 (last visited January 28, 2004);  Nigeria 419 
Coalition,  at http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/ (last visited October 5, 2004).
53
 Deborah Fallows, Spam: How it is Hurting Email and Degrading the Quality of Life on the Internet at iv, 
PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE FOUNDATION, available at http://www.pewinternet.org (last visited January 28, 
2004).  
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because of needing to cover fines, court costs, attorneys’ fees, settlement costs, the bureaucratic 
costs of setting up compliance mechanisms with consent decrees, settlement agreements and 
court decisions.  
3.  Microsystem:  Consumers and Security Related Crime
As more consumers use the internet, the ease of access to a pool of potential victims for 
information crime increases for fraudsters. Consequently, consumer information crime will 
undoubtedly continue to rise.  These consumer harms also relate to confidentiality, integrity and 
availability.
Consumers’ ability to successfully engage in many commercial activities is contingent 
upon confidentiality, consumers usually authenticate their identity through knowledge of 
“secret” confidential information.54 Apart from phishing, confidentiality of user information is 
frequently compromised through what is commonly known as “spyware,”55 which can be 
generally defined as any application that sends information to a remote third party.  It is
estimated that approximately 70%-80% of PC’s today are infected with “spyware” applications 
sending user confidential information to an unauthorized third party.56 When consumer 
confidential information such as a credit card number or a social security number falls into the 
wrong hands, identity theft is a common result.57  Approximately ten million people in the 
54
 For example, when consumers forget a user name or password to access their bank balances online, they 
engage in an identity authentication process with the bank, which ascertains that each consumer is who s/he says 
through the consumer’s knowledge of confidential or little known information about the consumer, such as the 
consumer’s first pet’s name or social security number.
55
 Definitions of spyware vary across legislation.  For a discussion of spyware legislative efforts, see, e.g., 
California Goes After Spyware, WIRED, October 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65203,00.html (last visited March 15, 2005). Spyware can be embedded 
as part of other products installed by the user.  As such, it can bury itself into users’ hard drives in a manner which 
makes them difficult to ferret out and uninstall.  Like sniffers, these programs then convey information back to their 
author.  For a discussion of the definitional complexity of spyware see, e.g., Wikipedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spyware (last visited November 30, 2004).  For a definition of sniffers, see, e.g., 
Webopedia at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/sniffer.html (last visited November 30, 2004).
56 See Hank Levy, Measurement and Analysis of Spyware in a University Environment, available at
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/gribble/papers/spyware.pdf (last visited March 1, 2005);  Robert Lemos, 
Plague Carriers: Most users unaware of PC infections, CNET, October 25, 2004, available at
http://news.com.com/Plague+carriers+Most+users+unaware+of+PC+infections/2100-1029_3-5423306.html (last 
visited March 1, 2005). See also Study: Consumers Take Cyberattacks Lightly, CNET, September 30, 2004, 
available at http://news.com.com/Study+Consumers+take+cyberattacks+lightly/2100-7349_3-
5390749.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last visited November 29, 2004).
57
 An increasing number of these identity thefts arise out of phishing attacks.  During the last year, 
approximately 57 million people in the U.S., or 20% of the population, have been targeted by a phishing attack. It is 
estimated that approximately 5% of phishing attempts are successful.  See, e.g., Dawn Kawamoto, U.S. Hit by Rise 
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United States became victims of identity theft in 2003, which equates to 25% of U.S. 
households,58 and identity theft is considered the fastest growing crime.59
Spam,60 malspam,61 spyware and malicious code compromise integrity and availability of 
consumers’ systems, frequently with “consent” from the user.62 In particular, a merger of 
spammers and virus writers63 is generating a new variant of spam, malspam, which intentionally 
capitalizes on the user’s weak information security to siphon data or computing resources from 
the user without the user’s knowledge.  The malspam problem is already at a critical level: 
in Phishing Attacks, CNET, May 6, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/U.S.+hit+by+rise+in+phishing+attacks/2100-7355_3-5207297.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last 
visited November 29, 2004). Variants of "phishing" e-mails circulating have increased in number from 279 to 
215,643 over the past six months.  See, e.g., Munir Kotadia, Phising Scams Lure More Users, CNET, April 19, 2004, 
available at http://news.com.com/%27Phishing%27+scams+luring+more+users/2100-7355_3-
5194807.html?tag=st.rn (last visited November 29, 2004).  
58
 Christine Dugan, Federal survey: Identity theft hits 1 in 4 U.S. households, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2003
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/2003-09-03-idtheft_x.htm (last visited October 12, 2004).
59
 Simultaneously, however, identity theft is hard to measure accurately because it is severely underreported, 
with only approximately 25% of victims filing police reports. See FTC Identity Theft Survey at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheftmini.htm (last visited November 29, 2004). Meanwhile, state level 
enforcement in finding perpetrators of identity theft has entailed logistical challenges. According to Chris Hoofnagle 
of EPIC, "A big problem in identity theft comes from lack of enforcement.  There are problems with state authorities 
who tend not to want to deal with the problem. If you're a Washington, D.C., resident and someone in California 
steals your identity, both Washington and California police will play ping-pong with your case to avoid dealing with 
it. They have other priorities. Enforcement at a federal level may deter the crime and provide the opportunity to 
capture thieves who are evading state enforcement." See Declan McCullagh, Season over for Phishing, CNET, July 
15, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/Season+over+for+phishing/2100-1028_3-
5270077.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last visited November 29, 2004).
60
 Although the concept of spam is generally contemplated in connection with email, in reality, spam impacts a 
variety of types internet communications.  For example, the first large-scale spam incident occurred on a bulletin 
board and not through email.  A law firm, Canter & Siegel, decided to advertise its immigration law services 
through a UseNet posting.  See Peter H. Lewis, Arizona Lawyers Form Company for Internet Advertising, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, May 7, 1994,  available at 
http://www.eff.org/Infra/Commerce_online/lawyers_form_i_company.announce ,(last visited January 28, 2004). 
Spam can arrive through instant messaging applications and other real time communications as well as through 
email.  Stefanie Olsen, Will Instant Messaging Become Instant Spamming?, CNET, February 16, 2001, available at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-252765.html?legacy=cnet  (last visited November 29, 2004). Most recently, for 
example, spam has begun to arrive on user desktops as pop-up advertisements even when no browser window is 
open. See e.g., John P. Mello, Feds Obtain Restraining Order Against Super Spammers, E-COMMERCE TIMES, 
November 6, 2003, available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/32069.html (last visited November 29, 
2004).
61
 The term MalSpam is this author’s coinage.  It is intended to refer to malicious spam, meaning spam which 
capitalizes upon or creates a security vulnerability for either commercial or destructive purposes.  See Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Spam and Security: Understanding the Connection Assessing Legal Strategy After the CAN-SPAM
Act,” 5 ILB 307, 312 (Mar. 04).
62
 Users unknowingly or carelessly “consent” to the installation of spyware on their machines 80% of the time. 
See, e.g., Spyware: Users Say Yes to It, WIRED, October 31, 2004 available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,65539,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_4 (last visited November 29, 2004). 
The debate over what constitutes adequate consumer consent to downloading spyware is at the crux of the legal 
debate over the regulation of spyware.  
63
 Bob Sullivan, The Secret Tricks Spammers Use, MSNBC, August 13, 2003, available at www.msnbc.com
(last visited January 28, 2004).
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according to the Federal Trade Commission, it is estimated that as much as 30% of all spam 
currently results from “zombie drones” 64 or security-compromised computers that have been 
turned into spam platforms controlled remotely by spam senders.65
Consumers victimized by information security related crime suffer both economic 
integrity harms and the negative psychological feeling of helplessness frequently associated with 
crime.66 The pervasiveness of spam has impaired users’ sense of control over availability of their 
own systems to the extent that users are starting to use the internet less as a consequence of 
spam. 67  This loss of use arises not only out of annoyance at filtering through their inboxes to 
64
 Zombie drones are security compromised machines that can be controlled remotely without the user’s 
knowledge for sending spam or other malicious purposes.  See e.g., Primer: zombie drone, WASHINGTON POST, 
February 1, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A304-2004Jan31.html (last visited 
January 28, 2004); Testimony of Thomas M. Dailey, Chair and President U.S. Internet Service Providers 
Association, General Counsel, Verizon Online, Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, June 16, 2004, available at 
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Dailey%20Testimony1.pdf (last visited March 1, 2005).  Purchasing spam 
time on a zombie drone is also relatively inexpensive, costing as little as 3-10 cents per host machine per week. See, 
e.g., For rent: Hacked zombie PCs for Net mischief, available at 
http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/top/story/0,4136,67698-1093276740,00.html?  (last visited November 29, 2004). See 
also Sunbreaks, A New Species: Stefan Savage’s Talk at NDSS, February 4, 2005, at http://sunbreaks.blogspot.com/
(last visited March 1, 2005).
65
 David Bank, New Virus Can Turn You Into a Spammer, WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 29, 2004, available 
at http://www.wsj.com. Also a black market has developed for zero-day exploit code to be included in or used in 
connection with spam with the going rate currently set at approximately $4,000-$6,000 per exploit. Zero-day exploit 
code is code which exploits a security vulnerability for which there is no known patch and of which the vendor is 
not aware.  See e.g., George V. Hulme, Zero-day Attacks Expected to Increase, INFORMATION WEEK, March 24, 
2003, available at http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20030321S0029 (last visited November 29, 2004); 
Comments of Simple Nomad, Stanford University, Cybersecurity, Research and Disclosure Conference, November 
22, 2003. Professional spam senders are also known to be, among other things, authoring increasingly personal 
looking emails which contain viruses for the explicit purpose of harvesting email addresses to compile saleable 
databases for the purpose of sending spam. Reuters, The Beagle Has Landed, WIRED, January 23, 2004, available at 
www.wired.com (last visited January 28, 2004). See, also, e.g., Ron Hale, Intrusion Crackdown, available at 
http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/telenisus.htm (last visited January 31, 2004).
66
 For example, victims frequently feel residual psychological trauma as long as five years after a crime. See, 
e.g., G.M. Herek, J.R. Gillis, J.C.Cogan, 67 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 941 (1999).
67
 Deborah Fallows, Spam: How it is Hurting Email and Degrading the Quality of Life on the Internet, 12 PEW 
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE FOUNDATION, available at www.pewinternet.org (last visited January 28, 2004).  To 
date, the FTC has prosecuted under 100 individuals and entities for spam fraud.  See, e.g., Prepared Statement of the 
Federal Trade Commission on Unsolicited Commercial Email Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet, U.S. House of Representatives, July 9, 2003, available at www.ftc.gov (last visited January 28, 2004).  
Most of these enforcement actions involved false content and were brought under Section 5 of the Fair Trade Act, 
alleging that the defendants in question engaged in unfair trade practices.  See e.g., FTC v. G. M. Funding, No. 
SACV 02-1026 DOC (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 2002); FTC v. Brian Westby, No. 032-3030 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 15, 
2003); FTC v. NetSource One, No. 022-3077 (W.D. Ky. filed Nov. 2, 2002); FTC v. Cyber Data, No. CV 02-2120 
LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2002); FTC v. Internet Specialists, No. 302 CV 01722 RNC (D.Conn. filed Oct. 2002);
FTC v. Patrick Cella et al., No. CV-03-3202 (C.D. Cal.) (complaint filed May 7, 2003); FTC v. K4 Global 
Publishing, Inc. et al., No. 5:03-CV0140-3 (M.D. Ga.) (complaint filed May 7, 2003); FTC v. Clickformail.com, 
Inc., No. 03-C-3033 (N.D. Ill.) (complaint filed May 7, 2003). 
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find a handful of legitimate messages, but also from fear of fraud:  currently, a majority of spam 
is sent with intent to defraud.68 Finally, spyware and malicious code can usurp availability and 
damage integrity of systems in a manner almost invisible to the user.  For example, currently 
spyware related problems account for approximately 15% of at least one computer 
manufacturer’s customer availability complaints, up from only 2% last year.69
Corollary losses associated with availability and integrity for consumers can occur 
offline. For example, individuals take for granted that provided they maintain a good credit 
report, participating in the social institution of real property ownership is their prerogative.  
However, an identity theft victim frequently realizes the extent of his/her victimization at the 
point of attempting to obtain a mortgage; a credit report is run and the victim sometimes finds 
that a fraudster has stolen the individual’s identity and has already taken out a mortgage in the 
victim’s name.70  Without remedying the effects of the crime, property ownership is foreclosed 
to the victim, and transaction costs accrue to all parties involved in the failed transaction.
B. Recalibrating Information Control after the Technology Revolution
The primary reason our society now faces a pivotal decision point in information control
policy is  the information technology revolution of the last decade.  Although computing began to 
take root in non-technology industry in the 1980’s and primitive email systems were not 
uncommon, consumers did not begin to use information technology for communication and 
68
 According to the most recent estimates of the Federal Trade Commission, at least 65% of spam contain 
fraudulent content or attempts to induce the recipient to enter into a fraudulent transaction.  In addition to fraudulent 
content, requests to be removed from spam recipient lists were not honored at least 63% of the time.  Federal Trade 
Commission, False Claims in Spam, 8, April 30, 2003 available at www.ftc.gov (last visited January 28, 2004). 
Spam fraud losses frequently reach as high as $4,000 per victim. The highest median dollar losses reported the FTC 
were found among victims of the Nigerian Letter fraud, whose losses were approximately $3,864 each. See, e.g., 
IFCC 2002 Internet Fraud Report, available at http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/2002_IFCCReport.pdf (last visited 
November 29, 2004).
69 Spyware: Users Say Yes to It, WIRED, October 31, 2004 available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,65539,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_4 (last visited November 29, 2004). 
Malicious code can capitalize on existing security vulnerabilities in software purchased by the consumer “off the 
shelf.”  Depending on the nature of the vulnerability, if a malicious actor discovers the vulnerability before it is 
patched by the consumer on a machine, remote compromise is a real danger.  Code Red, Code Red II, Nimba, 
Slammer, Blaster, Sasser all used remotely exploitable vulnerabilities to take over user machines.  Approximately 
80% of vulnerabilities discovered last year presented the potential for remote exploitation. See, e.g., Neils Johnson,  
Symantec Administration and Security Solutions, available at http://www.lsz-
consulting.at/pdf/usa_oktober_04/Symantec_Protect_and_Manage_Sales.pdf (last visited March 1, 2005).
70 See, e.g., Utah Attorney General, Press Release: ID Theft + Mortgage Fraud= Utah’s Newest Scam, available 
at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/PrRel/prmay192004.htm (last visited November 26, 2004). 
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commercial purposes en masse until the internet boom of 1998-2001.71  It was the entry of 
consumers into the internet space that reconfigured the relationship among business entities, 
consumers, and information criminals.  Personally identifiable consumer information became a 
key corporate asset for many businesses, and the nature of corporate-consumer information 
exchange was altered. Simultaneously, entities increasingly realized the efficiency and 
convenience of corporate data centralization into information networks, and malicious actors 
realized the efficiency of targeting these networks for attack, stealing both corporate and 
consumer information.
 These three groups of actors – consumers, corporate entities, and information criminals -
currently demonstrate different phases of technology learning and integration.   As a 
consequence, they exist in an unequal power relationship with respect to each other reflective of 
their disparate levels of technology learning and integration.  In order to stem the tide of 
information theft and improve the stability of the information marketplace, knowledge 
equalization through technology learning may be required.
1. Disparate Levels of Technology Learning of Consumers, Business Entities 
and Information Criminals
According to education theory, the stages of technology learning can be divided into 
five distinct developmental phases: entry, adoption, adaptation, appropriation, and invention.72
The entry phase refers to the stage where the individual is initially introduced to the technology 
and the transformed physical environment that has resulted.73 Incorporation of new technology 
71
  For a discussion of consumer email use see, e.g., Pew Internet and American Life Project, Report: Online 
Activities and Pursuits, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/report_display.asp?r=106 (last visited November 
30, 2004).
72 David C. Dwyer, Cathy Ringstaff, Judith Haymore, Sandholtz, Teacher Beliefs and Practices, Part I: Patterns 
of Change The Evolution of Teachers’ Instructional Beliefs and Practices in High-Access-to-Technology
Classrooms First–Fourth Year Findings, available at 
http://images.apple.com/education/k12/leadership/acot/pdf/rpt08.pdf (last visited March 14, 2005).  Another useful 
framework on adult learning of technology was offered by Russell.  Russel asserted that adults learning new 
technology pass through six stages on their way to becoming confident with technology, beginning at any point and 
progress through at their own rates. The stages were (a) awareness but nonuse, (b) learning the process, (c) 
understanding and application of the process, (d) familiarity and confidence, (e) adaptation to other contexts and 
viewing a computer as a tool, and (f) creative applications to new contexts.  See, e.g., A. L. Russell, Stages in 
learning new technology, 25 COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION 4, 173-178 (1995).
73 See Dwyer et al. note 72 supra.
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can be a change agent, stimulating reflection, redesign, and rejuvenation of effective practices.74
The adoption phase describes the process where the individual begins to accept the technology 
and tries to integrate it into the environment.75 During the adaptation phase, traditional processes 
become supported with the new technology, and the benefits of the technology start to become
visible to the user.  This visible progress provides a source of satisfaction for users, which then 
encourages greater incorporation of the technology into work.76  The next stage, the 
appropriation phase means a movement toward mastery of the technology which results in 
increasingly more adventurous uses and individualization.77  Finally, the invention phase refers 
to a state of technology development and integration where the user exhibits a mindset of 
experimentation, change and innovation, viewing the technology as a tool78 in a social 
interaction where technology knowledge is constructed rather than imparted or transferred.79  To 
borrow a key concept of systems theory,80 the first four phases might be termed “first order” 
change,81 and the last might be termed “second order” change.82 We currently face an 
information crisis in our society because of the mismatch of technology development and 
integration levels among consumers, business entities and information criminals.   
a.  Consumers:  Adoption and Adaptation
Consumers are progressing through the steps of first order change, on average hovering 
around the adoption or adaptation stage, with a minority entering the appropriation stage.   They 
are beginning to successfully incorporate technology into their daily routines in the aggregate, to 
74
 In the context of managing environmental issues, the term “adaptive management” has arisen to reflect this 
dynamic management process.  For a discussion of adaptive management theory, see, e.g.,  British Columbia 
Ministry of Forests, available at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/amhome/Amdefs.htm (last visited January 17, 2005).
75 See Dwyer et al. note 72 supra.
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78
 The term tool here is used in the Contextualist sense of the word.  In other words, a “tool” in Contextualist 
developmental psychology theory refers to any instrument that scaffolds learning and permits an individual to 
accomplish more than she/he otherwise could. It was coined by developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky.  For a 
discussion of cultural tools, see LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962). 
79 See Dwyer et al. note 72 supra.
80
 For a discussion of systems theory see, e.g., Vicki Sauter,  Information Systems Analysis, Systems Theory, 
available at http://www.umsl.edu/~sauter/analysis/intro/system.htm (last visited November 30, 2004).
81
 Bateson discusses the difference between first order change and second order change. First order change 
refers to the process of acquiring new skills and learning how to do something new.  GREGEORY BATESON, STEPS TO 
ECOLOGY OF THE MIND, 50 (1972). 
82
 Second order change, for Bateson, refers to learning new methods of learning.  As such this kind of change 
requires a deep structural understanding of a system and its rules.  Id. 
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the point where some consumers have trouble disconnecting from their technology tools.83
Approximately 63% of the U.S. consumers now have an internet connection,84 and over half of 
all U.S. households had computers by July 2000.85 About 53% of those with an internet 
connection, or 68 million people, surf the web on a daily basis, approximately 45% send email 
every day, and another 30% use a search engine each day.86  Over 53 million U.S. adults have 
published content, responded to posts, posted pictures, shared files and or otherwise created 
internet content.87 Therefore, of the approximately 218 million U.S. adults,88 at least a quarter 
have already contributed internet content.  This statistic demonstrates that the consumer 
population progressing through adoption and adaptation toward the appropriation phase.  With 
time, navigating today’s information systems may become second nature to a majority of U.S. 
consumers just as using an automatic teller machine is today, but this is not yet the case.
b.  Business entities: On the Cusp of Appropriation and Invention
Business entities in the aggregate are on the threshold between first and second order 
change.  Business uses of technology are becoming creative and individualized.  Information 
technologies are increasingly integral parts of even the most low-tech of manufacturers,89 and 
customization of corporate software is standard practice. Additionally, new business models that 
would not have been viable prior to the information technology revolution of the last ten years. 
Numerous entities now exist whose entire business model is predicated substantially on 
information leveraging of consumer data collected through information technology.90
83 See, e.g., Yahoo! and OMD Unveil Findings of Internet Deprivation Study, WEBPRONEWS, September 27,  
2003 available at www.webpronews.com (last visited November 29, 2004).
84 See Pew Internet and American Life Project, Percent of American Adults Online, available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/InternetAdoption.jpg (last visited October 13, 2004).
85 NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
(U.S. Dept. of Comm. Jul. 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/falling.html (last visited Jan. 
26, 2004).
86
 Pew Internet and American Life Project, Daily Activities, available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/Daily_Activities_4.23.04.htm (last visited November 29, 2004).
87
 Amanda Lenhart, Deborah Fallows, John Horrigan, Content Creation Online, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN 
LIFE PROJECT, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Content_Creation_Report.pdf (last visited October 
13, 2004).
88
 U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Estimates Number of Adults, Older People and School-Age Children in 
States, at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/001703.html  (last visited 
October 13, 2004).
89 See, e.g., Alliance Manufacturing, inventory software available at www.alliancemfg.com (last visited 
November 29, 2004).
90 See, e.g., B. JOSEPH PINE, STAND DAVIS, MASS CUSTOMIZATION: THE NEW FRONTIER IN BUSINESS 
COMPETITION (1999).
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Because of this integration of technology into the heart of business entities’ management, 
a fundamental change or paradigm shift91 in corporate identity has occurred. As a 
consequence, the traditional legal “nexus of contracts”92 approach and the legal approach of 
viewing the corporation as the equivalent of a natural person93 do not adequately conceptualize 
the dynamic, emergent reality of the corporation.  A corporation is more accurately 
conceptualized as a system with intersecting networks.94 Corporate entities have evolved in their 
organization from a structural paradigm95 with information distributed across the enterprise and 
individuals toward a scale-free network paradigm 96 where information and data flows have been 
concentrated into “hubs” of centralized information and “nodes” of use throughout the entity.  
Simultaneously, however, although data is more centralized, increasing numbers of individuals 
have easy access to more corporate data because of corporate network technology.  In other 
words, corporate identity has been restructured around the architectures of entities’ information 
systems.
This reorganization of corporate information around information systems has precipitated 
not only a transformation in corporate identity but also the emergence of new business 
information risks. Similarly, previously existing risks have been exacerbated; for example, the 
transaction costs of the act of corporate data theft have decreased due to data centralization. One 
hack into a network can provide hundreds of datafiles that can be instantly copied and, perhaps, 
are not as readily detected as “missing” because of the perfectly duplicable nature of the medium 
91 See THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
92 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporation, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1193(2004); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Anti-Takeover Amendments, Managerial 
Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA L. REV. 1257 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The 
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 VAND L. REV. (1982). For a critique of this theory, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
93 Id.  But, for a discussion of the historical context of corporate law generally and limited liability in particular 
as an important factor in addition to the standard conceptualization of corporate identity, see Stephen B. Presser, 
Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:  Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L.REV. 148 
(1992).
94
 Corporations are more accurately conceptualized as networks of individuals with bounded rationality which 
are aggregated into dynamic, nonlinear systems, whose behavior is constrained by, among other things, bundles of 
contracts.  Human agency can shape social systems such as these to generate short term predictability, but long term 
predictability is not possible. See, e.g., David Levy, Applications and Limitations of Complexity Theory in 
Organizational Theory and Strategy in JACK RABIN, GERALD MILLER, W. BARTLEY HILDRETH, HANDBOOK OF 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (2000); David Levy, Chaos Theory and Strategy: Theory, Application, management 
Implications, 15 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 167 (1994).
95 ALBERTO LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2002). 
96 Id. 
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of the data.  In the past, stealing the same amount of information required a larger time 
commitment in the act of theft.  Physically copying files to avoid detection or physically carrying 
files out of building was not an expeditious process and required presence onsite.  The ease of 
data transference facilitates greater exchange and leveraging of information with other entities. 
However, with greater ease of data sharing also comes greater risk of data leakage from partners
and attack from information criminals. 
Therefore, when analyzing the level of technology learning and integration of entities, it 
can be said that entities are on the cusp of first and second order change.  They have successfully 
incorporated information systems into their operations for the most part and many entities 
modify their systems to perform customized tasks.  As such, entities tend to demonstrate a basic 
mastery of technology above that of the average consumer and are moving toward harnessing 
technology to innovate.
c.  Information Criminals: Information Security Inventors
Information criminals frequently sit squarely in the phase of second order change.  They
are frequently of higher than average technological proficiency and, in some cases, represent the 
bleeding edge of technology research and development.  They are innovating in a socially 
detrimental manner, but they are unquestionably, in many cases, intellectual entrepreneurs.97  For 
example, in the context of spam, spammers adjust their behaviors over time in response to anti-
spam efforts, and, consequently, an information security arms race of sorts is occurring between 
spammers and the anti-spam industry.  Information thievery ventures are highly lucrative for 
spammers, with some professional spammer employees earning salaries in excess of $100,000 
per year, and the professional spammer entity owners earning millions of dollars per year.98
Consequently, strong financial incentives exist for spammers’ innovating to stay in business.  
Spammers work to write spam dissemination programs which can circumvent current 
technological anti-spam protections in place,99 while simultaneously the leading minds in 
97
 Phishing attacks are increasingly sophisticated.  See, e.g., Vikram Desai, Phishing--who's taking the bait 
now?, CNET, November 23, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/Phishing+who's+taking+the+bait+now/2010-
7349-5463346.html (last visited November 26, 2004).
98
 Comments of Simple Nomad, Stanford University, Cybersecurity, Research and Disclosure Conference, 
November 22, 2003.
99
  For example, increasingly spam messages include “chaff” – strings of characters that appear randomly 
generated for the purpose of confusing spam filters, which presume that only a legitimate message would contain 
such a string.  For a discussion of chaff see, e.g., Geoff Hulten, Anthony Penta, Gopalakrishnan Seshadrinathan, 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
24
industry at entities such as Microsoft and Yahoo! race against them to foil these new spamming 
products.   For instance, when industry resorted to puzzles that required human input to enable 
transaction processing, spammers outsourced the human labor of performing these puzzles called 
human interactive proofs or HIPs100 to workers in developing countries.101 It is part of this 
evolutionary research and development process of spammers that has also lead to the merger of 
virus writers and spammers and the ascendancy of malspam and phishing; spammers are 
innovating to stay one step ahead of technological spam regulation. Information criminals’ 
ability to continue their activities is dependent on their ability to constantly innovate, which they 
will undoubtedly continue to do successfully.
2.  Fixing the Information Security Crisis  
As discussed in the previous section, the technology knowledge disparity among 
consumers, entities and information criminals creates a complex social policy problem for 
resolution.  A two pronged goal results:  first, to facilitate the learning of entities and consumers
regarding good information security practices by raising awareness of the importance of 
information security and, second, to build trust in the new marketplace through driving corporate 
investment, innovation, and self-monitoring in information security while guaranteeing 
minimum levels of care as a safety net for consumers.
a. Scaffolding Information Security Knowledge Acquisition:  Technical 
Learning Improvement
Corporate entities and consumers do not yet appear to understand the importance and the 
beneficial consequences of strong information security practices.  Both entities and consumers 
underestimate the severity of the information security risks they face. This prevailing lack of 
basic information security knowledge manifests itself through certain common information 
security errors: entities and consumers frequently make rudimentary information security 
mistakes relating to updating and patching software, physical information access control, social 
Manav Mishra, Trends in Spam Products and Methods, available at http://www.ceas.cc/papers-2004/165.pdf (last 
visited  March 1, 2005).
100
  HIPs are security puzzles used to verify that the sender of an email is a human and that the email is not an 
automatically generated bulk spam email from a machine. See e.g., Carnegie Mellon, HIPs, at 
http://www.aladdin.cs.cmu.edu/hips/ (last visited January 28, 2004).
101 See e.g., SpamCop list, August 16, 2001, at http://news.spamcop.net/pipermail/spamcop-list/2001-
August/018361.html (last visited March 6, 2005).  
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
25
engineering102 attempts, technical configurations of systems and password practices.  These 
mistakes leave them vulnerable to attack by malicious third parties and insiders.
i. Business Entities
The current state of corporate information security is bleak. A 2004 worldwide 
information security study conducted by CIO Magazine and PricewaterhouseCoopers of 8100
information technology professionals (the “PwC Study”) revealed that entities’ security 
resources did not grow from 2003 to 2004, and at least 55% of companies surveyed had not 
measured the effectiveness of their security policies and procedures.103 Particularly of concern is 
the extent of companies’ secrecy regarding their security failures – more than half of entities 
included in the survey report their security breaches to no one because they believe the 
information will damage corporate reputation and the shareprice.104  Even internal reporting was 
weak and information security knowledge was not being disbursed throughout entities, in 
particular usually never making its way to the legal department.105  Therefore, based on this 
admission of a tendency toward secrecy, it is logical to assume that corporate information 
security practices are even less stringent than as reported by the professionals in this study.  Most 
disappointingly perhaps, according to the professionals in this study, government regulations and 
potential liability were the leading factors driving security investments and improvements. 106
The most frequent sources of corporate information vulnerability as reported by 
information technology professionals were hackers (66%) and renegade current and former 
employees (49%).  Hackers frequently gain access to corporate proprietary information because 
an entity’s updating and patching behavior is inconsistent.  Despite knowledge of vulnerabilities 
and access to appropriate patches, corporate entities are not always prompt with patching serious 
security holes.107 For example, in one study of system administrator behavior, it was found that 
102
 Social engineering involves tricking people offline into revealing information to compromise security. See, 
e.g., Hyperdictionary at www.hyperdictionary.com/computing/social+engineering (last visited November 29, 2004).
103
  Lorraine Cosgrove Ware, CIO Research Reports, The State of Information Security 2004, CIO, September 
1, 2004, available at http://www2.cio.com/research/surveyreport.cfm?id=75 (last visited November 29, 2004).
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107
 Robert Lemos, Study: System admins slow to zap bugs, CNET, November 19, 2002, available at 
http://news.com.com/Study:+System+admins+slow+to+zap+bugs/2100-1001_3-966398.html (last visited 
November 29, 2004).   But see Experts: Microsoft security gets an 'F', CNN, February 1, 2003, available at 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
26
systems administrators were not adequately responsive to vulnerability announcements:  during a 
seven week period between the public announcement of a serious vulnerability108 and the release 
of a worm that exploited that vulnerability109 causing significant corporate losses, only 40% of 
servers with the vulnerability were patched.110  One of the factors identified by the study as a 
major influence in this unacceptably low patching rate was a lack of adequate corporate 
resources being devoted to information security.111
Physical information control is intrinsically interwoven with technological information 
control. For instance, one common practice used by attackers looking to steal proprietary 
information is known as “dumpster diving.” 112  It is common for corporate espionage to include 
rummaging through garbage of competitors113 in search of carelessly disposed sensitive 
information.  A variation on the theme of physical information control is protecting against 
attempts at social engineering, which involve physical space acts of deception to acquire 
information for use in other attacks.114 Also, certain network settings and poor password controls 
can facilitate attackers’ attempts to compromise networks.115
Entities frequently forget that many attackers are internal.  Failing to require that 
employees change passwords on a regular, frequent basis or failing to immediately deactivate 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/02/01/microsoft.security.reut/ (last visited March 1, 2005) (discussing 
problems with patches and why immediate patching is not necessarily always the correct risk management decision).
108 Id. 
109
 Robert Lemos, Slapper worm smarting lies, ZDNET, September 20, 2002 available at 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-958758.html (last visited December 4, 2004).
110
 Lemos at note 110.
111 Id. 
112
 For example, in one case where an attacker was attempting to gain reconnaissance about Microsoft 
Corporation, a woman attempted to purchase the garbage of a pro-Microsoft trade group, offering as much as $500 
to each of the two cleaners and $200 for their supervisor. See, e.g., Stuart McClure & Joel Scambray, Forget the 
firewall; guard your garbage against dumpster diving hackers, INFOWORLD, available at 
http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/00/07/03/000703opswatch.html? (last visited November 29, 2004).
113
 In this type of attack, favorite targets for rummaging through trash are dumpsters, as the term suggests, or 
waste baskets through bribed cleaning staff.  On occasion, however, breaking and entering has been used as well to 
secure information.  Id.
114 For example, a group of hackers called the Phonemasters is known to have penetrated systems at AT&T, 
MCI WorldCom, Sprint, Equifax, TRW, and the databases of Lexis-Nexis and Dun & Bradstreet using techniques 
involving mostly dumpster diving and social engineering. Id. 
115
 For example, networks frequently emit information about specifications of the network and the user to any 
third parties who query for such information for the alleged purpose of client authentication. For a discussion of 
client authentication protocols see, e.g., Kevin Fu, Emil Sit, Kendra Smith, Nick Feamster, Dos and Don’ts of Client 
Authentication on the Web, available at http://www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/papers/webauth:sec10.pdf (last visited 
November 30, 2004; Cem Paya, A Framework for Network Authentication Protocols, available at 
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/abstracts/TR98-328/ (last visited October 10, 2004).
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employee passwords upon an employee’s departure can result in a data breach.116  Employees 
commonly receive inadequate security training,117 and current employees with access to 
unnecessarily large amounts of confidential information pose a serious risk.118
ii. Consumers
Consumers are, on the whole, even less knowledgeable and less thoughtful about 
information security than business entities.  Particularly when consumers with lax information 
security behaviors use always-on connections119 with high bandwidth,120 they become attractive 
targets to malicious third parties for remote compromise.  For example, according to research 
from Dartmouth compiling several studies on undergraduates,121  although over 50% of users 
stated they are worried about information security, 58% rarely or never looked for browser 
security signals before submitting their confidential information through the Web.122 60% of 
users updated their anti-virus software less frequently than once a month. 123 Over 50% have 
shared their passwords, 65% never changed their passwords and another 36% used the same 
password for all their applications and websites.124 Poor password management makes 
consumers especially vulnerable to identity theft.125 Similarly, in a recent survey of consumers 
regarding their information practices, over 30% of consumers believed they had a higher 
116
   Employees were second only to hackers as sources of information vulnerability according to the PwC 
Study. See PwC Study note 111 supra.
117 See, e.g., Ernst and Young, 2004 Global Information Security Survey, available at 
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/2004_Global_Information_Security_Survey/$file/2004_Glob
al_Information_Security_Survey_2004.pdf (last visited November 29, 2004)
118 A corporate practice of granting “least privilege” could alleviate a portion of this problem.  For example, a 
help desk worker at AOL sold the entirety of the AOL subscriber database to a spammer. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, 
AOL customer list stolen, sold to spammer, MSNBC, June 24, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5279826/ (last visited November 30, 2004).  
119 Always-on connections are high bandwidth connections consistently connected to the internet.  Consumers 
who have always-on connections but do not patch their systems regularly present particularly attractive targets for 
being turned into zombie drones.  See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Pop-up Ad Spammers Settle FTC Charges
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/08/dsquared.htm (last visited November 30, 2004); See also Federal Trade 
Commission v. D Squared Solutions, LLC, et al., 2003 WL 22881377 (D.Md.).
120 Id. 
121 Denise Anthony, User Security Behavior, PKI Unlocked Summit, Dartmouth College, July 2004 available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~deploypki/summit04/presentations/PKIUserBehavior.ppt#37 (last visited October 11, 
2004). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125
 Dinesh C. Sharma, Study: Identity theft worries consumers, CNET, February 25, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/Study+Identity+theft+worries+consumers/2100-7355_3-5165044.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last 
visited November 29, 2004).
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likelihood of winning the lottery than being victimized by malicious code, and only 60% knew 
the last time they updated their security software.126  In reality, of course, the risks highlighted in 
the section above are severe: industry projections estimate that consumer internet users will be 
exposed to approximately 100,000 various pieces of malicious code in a year’s time. 127 By 
failing to protect themselves, users have defaulted, perhaps unwisely, to trusting the system and 
the reputation of the corporate entities with whom they do business; consumers expect 
technology to be secure, want assurances that the system will not fail and favor regulation.128
b. Setting Minimum Legal Standards for Information Security
It is in this context that Congress has begun to legislate in the area of information security 
through the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act. 129  In part, Congress is legislating to facilitate the 
development of minimum standards of data care, as will be discussed in the next section.  
Another part of this burgeoning information security legislative effort, however, is a public 
relations effort:  Congress hopes to bring attention to the importance of information security and 
to scaffold the learning of both consumers and entities with regard to good information security 
practices.
As mentioned previously, government regulations and potential liability are the leading 
factors driving security investments and improvements by entities according to information 
126
 But, by comparison, 90% knew the name of the performer at the last Superbowl halftime show. CNet, Study: 
Consumers Take Cyberattacks Lightly, CNET, September 30, 2004, available at 
http://news.com.com/Study+Consumers+take+cyberattacks+lightly/2100-7349_3-5390749.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb
(last visited December 4, 2004).
127 Id. 
128 Id. See also Denise Anthony, User Security Behavior, PKI Unlocked Summit, Dartmouth College, July 
2004 available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~deploypki/summit04/presentations/PKIUserBehavior.ppt#37 (last 
visited October 11, 2004). 
129
 The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (“ITPEA”) Public Law 108-275, 16 CFR 316 , March 11, 2004, 
was also signed into law on July 15, 2004.  The Act amended Chapter 47 of Title 18 to create an offense of 
“aggravated identity theft” that refers to the knowing transfers, possesses, or use of a means of identification of 
another person without permission. ITPEA provides for a term of imprisonment of 2 years in addition to the terms 
awarded for the accompanying felony.  States have also begun to legislate more vigorously in connection with 
identity theft. For example, California recently passed the most protective privacy legislation in the country, 
requiring financial institutions to inform consumers of data breaches.  See, e.g., Robert Lemos, Law Aims to Reduce 
Identity Theft, CNET, June 30, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/Law+aims+to+reduce+identity+theft/2100-
1017_3-1022341.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last visited February 24, 2005).  See also, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Season 
Over for Phishing, CNET, July 15, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/Season+over+for+phishing/2100-
1028_3-5270077.html?tag=st.rc.targ_mb (last visited February 24, 2005).
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security professionals. 130 The source of this concern by corporations arises from the increasing 
momentum of Congressional and regulatory agency information security initiatives in the last 
five years.  For example, in 2002, the Federal Trade Commission designated one day, October 
27, as National Cybersecurity Day.131  By comparison, in 2004, the entirety of the month of 
October has been designated as National Information Security Month.132 Legislation to date has 
spanned three primary types of data – children’s data, health data, financial data and email data.  
i. COPPA
Children’s data collection was addressed by Congress in 1998 in the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).133 COPPA requires that websites targeting children under 
age 13 provide notice of privacy practices and obtain verifiable parental consent prior to 
collecting data from the child.  The statute also empowers the Federal Trade Commission to 
promulgate additional regulations to require the operator of a website subject to COPPA to 
establish and maintain reasonable procedures “to protect the confidentiality, security, and 
integrity of personal information collected from children.”134 Additionally promulgated 
regulations state that the appropriate security measures for protecting children’s data include
“using secure web servers and firewalls; deleting personal information once it is no longer being 
used; limiting employee access to data and providing those employees with data-handling 
training; and carefully screening the third parties to whom such information is disclosed.”135
However, encryption was deemed to be potentially cost prohibitive and left to the discretion of 
entities, as was the suggested use of contractual provisions requiring minimum standards of data 
care from third parties granted access to the collected children’s data.136  In other words, COPPA 
130
 Lorraine Cosgrove Ware, The State of Information Security, 2004, CIO, September 1, 2004, available at 
http://www2.cio.com/research/surveyreport.cfm?id=75 (last visited November 30, 2004).
131 See Federal Trade Commission at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/cybersecurityma.htm  (last visited 
November 29, 2004).
132 See Federal Trade Commission at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/infosecurity/ncsa.html  (last 
visited November 29, 2004).
133 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506. See also 16 CFR Part 312, Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule 
134
 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D)
135
 16 CFR Part 312.8 available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/64fr59888.pdf (last visited November 30, 
2004).  Sadly, this articulation of the technology specifications is suboptimal.  For example, the implementing 
regulations instruct companies to use “secure servers”; servers cannot be inherently “secure” or “vulnerable.”
Securing a server is a process that is ongoing.  Perhaps a better phraseology would be to have required companies to 
take all steps identified by a leading security research firm as the fundamental exercise of care in attempting to 
secure a server on an ongoing basis.
136 Id. 
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leaves much discretion in data security to the individual website operator and creates no external 
reporting mechanism to monitor internal security improvements of website operators subject to 
COPPA.
ii. HIPAA
In the area of health data privacy, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) was passed and signed into law in 1996 to provide a framework for, among other 
things, minimum levels of data care and security with regard to collection, storage and sharing of 
personally identifiable health information.137  Specifically, HIPAA requires that entities 
“covered”138 by HIPAA who are handling personally identifiable health information provide 
notice of privacy practices and ensure the privacy and security of the information.139 The 
administrative simplification rules to HIPPA can be divided into three segments – privacy rules, 
which took effect in April, 2003; transaction rules, which took effect October, 2003; and security
rules, which were published in the Federal Register on February 20, 2003,140 and become
effective for enforcement purposes on April 21, 2005.141 The final security rules mandate that 
covered entities implement administrative, physical and technical safeguards. 142 In particular, 
the HIPAA privacy rules require that responsibility for privacy within each organization be 
centralized in a Chief Privacy Officer.143 Also, both the HIPAA privacy144 and security rules 
137 Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191; See, e.g., U.S. Department of 
Labor, Fact Sheet: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fshipaa.html (last visited November 30, 2004).  For a discussion of HIPAA, see, 
e.g., Mary Beth Johnson, HIPAA Becomes Reality: Compliance with New Privacy, Security and Electronic 
Transmission Standards, 103 W. WA. L. REV. 541 (2001). See, also, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Lauren B. Steinfeld, 
Security and Privacy After September 11: The Health Care Example, 86 MINN.L.REV. 1515 (2002).
138
 Covered entities include health care providers, health information clearinghouses, and health plans. 45 CFR 
160.103
139
 45 CFR 164.520
140 See, e.g, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HIPAA Final Security Rule, 45 CFR Parts 160, 
162, 164 available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/security/03-3877.pdf (last visited November 
30, 2004).
141
 45 CFR 160.308
142 See Department of Health and Human Services, HIPAA Final Security Rule, 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, 164 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/security/03-3877.pdf (last visited November 30, 
2004); Price Waterhourse Coopers, How HIPAA and Security Intersect: Reporting on Request, available at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/DocID/67B8EB4D694ACC0685256DE8007EC9F6 (last visited 
November 30, 2004).
143
  Under § 164.530, entities are required to designate a privacy official who is responsible for the development 
and implementation of the policies and procedures of the entity and a contact person or office who is responsible for 
receiving complaints. See Department of Health and Human Services, Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 CFR § 
164.530(a) available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcTxt01.htm (last visited November 30, 2004). The 
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mandate disclosure of practices to consumers and require that contracts with third party 
providers include a warranty on the part of the provider to maintain the integrity, confidentiality
and availability of health data they receive.145
iii. GLBA
Financial information privacy was addressed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 
also known as the Financial Modernization Act of 1999.146 GLBA governs data handling of 
“financial institutions,”147 broadly defined. It requires that financial institutions provide notice of 
privacy practices and exercise care in data handling, including granting consumers opportunity to 
opt out of data sharing and a prohibition on using consumer financial information in ways not 
authorized by the consumer.148 GLBA also imposes a responsibility on financial institutions to 
enter into contracts with commercial partners with whom they shares data pursuant to an 
exemption under the act.  These contracts must prohibit the partners’ use of customer 
information for any purpose other than the purpose of the initial disclosure of information.149
However, to date, few entities have been prosecuted for violations of GLBA, and GLBA privacy 
notices have received much critique in the privacy community, resulting in new proposed rules 
regarding the format of GLBA disclosure statements. 150
iv. CANSPAM
role of the Chief Privacy officer is in flux.  Many companies not involved in handling health information have also 
begun to designate officer level privacy positions.  Price Waterhouse Coopers, How HIPAA and Security Intersect: 
Reporting on Request, available at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/DocID/67B8EB4D694ACC0685256DE8007EC9F6 (last visited 
November 30, 2004).
144
 45 CFR 164.502(e) and § 164.504(e).
145
 HIPAA Security Rule note 150 supra at 8359 available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/security/03-3877.pdf (last visited February 24, 2005).
146
 15 U.S.C. § 6801-6809.
147
 Financial institutions in GLBA refers to entities that offer financial products or services to individuals, such 
as loans, financial or investment advice, or insurance, including non-bank mortgage lenders, loan brokers, some 
financial or investment advisers, tax preparers, real estate settlement services providers, and debt collectors.  See, 
e.g., Federal Trade Commission at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glbshort.htm (last visited February 
24, 2005).
148 See Federal Trade Commission at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/031223anprfinalglbnotices.pdf  (last 
visited February 24, 2005).
14916 CFR Part 313, § 313.13, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/65fr33645.pdf (last visited February 24, 
2005).
150 See, e.g., FTC Enforces GLBA’s Rule Safeguards Against Mortgage Companies,  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/11/ns/htm (last visited November 29, 2004).
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In late 2003, Congress passed legislation to create national uniformity in spam email 
legal regulation, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act 
(the “CAN-SPAM Act”),151 which became effective as of January 1, 2004. 152 In general, the 
CAN-SPAM Act prohibits fraudulent or deceptive sender, subject or content information, 
dictionary attacks153 and address harvesting.154  It also requires that the option to opt-out from 
future mailings be provided in spam email, that such requests are honored, and that sexually 
explicit materials are clearly labeled as such.155 Despite the Act’s creation of a private right of 
action for internet service providers (“ISPs”),156 the Act preempts most state spam statutes, in 
whole or at least in substantial part.157   As such, it removes private rights of action granted by 
151
 15 U.S.C.A. Sect.7701 et seq. (2003).
152
 Four major technological methods have been used to attempt to regulate spam: accept or white lists, deny 
lists, filtering, and adding email “postage” to each message.  White lists entail maintaining a list of permitted senders 
and excluding messages not from these permitted senders.  See e.g., John Bone, AT&T Aborts Plans to Block Email, 
MSNBC, October 22, 2003, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3341685/ (last visited November 30, 2004). 
The second method, deny lists, uses rules to refuse acceptance of communication from certain forbidden parties 
considered to be “bad actors.” See e.g., Jane Waever, How to End Spam in the Future, MSNBC, July 9, 2003, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078599/ (last visited November 30, 2004).  A third method uses filters 
based on neural networks or Bayesian networks which are taught to distinguish spam from nonspam.  Id.  The final 
method involves imposing costs on senders of spam through “postage.”  Postage comes in various forms –
micropayments, “hashcash,” which extracts computational costs from senders through solving puzzles that burn 
CPU cycles, and challenge-response models, which require human attention time. Multiple methods can also be 
used in tandem.  Currently, no reliable system of micropayments exists. See, e.g., Win Treese, Putting It Together: 
Where are the Micropayments, 7 NETWORKER 3, 15-17 (2003) available at 
http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/950000/940840/p15-
treese.html?key1=940840&key2=4583595701&coll=GUIDE&dl=ACM&CFID=16535447&CFTOKEN=93848377
(last visited November 30, 2004). For a discussion of hashcash, See e.g., Adam Back, Hashcash: A Denial of Service 
Countermeasure, August 1, 2002, available at http://www.hashcash.org/hashcash.pdf (last visited January 28, 
2004).  In the context of spam emails, the favored technological method of the moment is imposing a challenge-
response model on an unverified sender, such as a Human Interactive Proofs.   See e.g., Carnegie Mellon, HIPs, 
http://www.aladdin.cs.cmu.edu/hips/ last visited on January 28, 2004. See Evan Hansen, Hotmail Tools Fight War 
Against Spam, ZDNET,  May 8, 2003 http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/legal/0,39020651,2134436,00.htm (last 
visited November 30, 2004) .  
153
 Dictionary attacks are a type of attack where all possible combinations of passwords or randomly generated 
email addresses are used to attempt to gain access to a protected resource or an existing email accounts.  See, e.g.,
Weboepedia at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/dictionary_attack.html.
154 15 U.S.C.A. Sect.7705 (2003).
155 Id. 
156
 15 U.S.C.A. Sect.7707(g) (2003).
157
 States have begun to also regulate in this space, however state statutes which regulate the same type of 
conduct as the CANSPAM Act were superseded by it. As of December 2003, 31 states had laws regulating the 
transmission of spam email.  None of these statutes contained an outright ban on spam email, but (1) restricted either 
the categories of recipients of spam email to those with a preexisting relationship with the sender or to those who 
otherwise affirmatively consented to spam email or (2) required clear labeling through a subject line containing the 
letters  ADV: or an opt-out method in the text of the spam to prevent future spam email from being sent to the 
recipient.  With a few exceptions, these statutes were largely unenforced by state attorney generals and few suits 
were brought under them by recipients until recently.  See e.g., Paul Roberts, Earthlink Wins $16 million in Spam 
Case, PC WORLD, May 7, 2003 available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,110627,00.asp (last visited 
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some state anti-spam statutes which have effectively been used by ISP’s, nonISP business, and 
consumers to obtain recourse against spammers.158 The Act has received mixed reviews at best 
to date159 and leaves many loopholes which may catalyze a boom in certain types of spam.160
vi. Enforcement
As demonstrated by the legislation described above, Congress has been active in 
attempting to address the information security crisis.  However, enforcement actions to support 
these legislative efforts have not been plentiful.  For example, to date the Federal Trade 
Commission has prosecuted fewer than 20 entities for violation of COPPA and their stated 
privacy policies.161 As a result of these matters, the FTC has levied fines as high as $80,000. 162
With regard to HIPAA, concern exists that enforcement will continue to be weak.  Office of 
Civil Rights Director Richard Campanelli, at a Department of Health and Human Services 
November 30, 2004). Cases making use of state level anti-spam email statutes as basis for suit have been relatively 
sparse, with no more than a few per state. See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation v. Does 1 through 50, Case No. 5:03-cv-
00644 (N.D. Ca. 2/14/03); Hypertouch v. Link It Software, Case No. CIV426832 (San Mateo Supr. Ct. 10/31/02); 
Morrison & Forrister v. Etracks.com, et al., Case No. CIV404294 (San Francisco Supr. Ct. 6/26/02);  Earthlink Inc. 
v. Doe No.1: 01-cv-2097 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Earthlink, Inc. v. Smith, No.1: 01-cv-2009 (N.D. Ga. 2001); MonsterHut 
Inc. v. PaeTec Communications, Inc., Case No. 107189-cv-2001 (Sup. Ct. Niagara Co. 2001), aff’d 294 A.D.2d 945 
(4th Dept. 2002); People of the State of New York v. MonsterHut, Inc., (N.Y. Sup.Ct.,N.Y.Cty.2/3/03); Verizon 
Online Services, Inc. v. Alan Ralsky, Additional Benefits, L.L.C. et al., Case No. 01-CV-432 (E.D.Va. 2001); 
America Online v. CN Productions, Inc., Case No.98-552-A (E.D.Va.1998); Terry Gilman v. Sprint 
Communications, Case No. 020406640 (Utah Dist. Ct., 3d Jud.Distr. 5/22/02); State of Washington v. Jason Heckel, 
d/b/a Natural Instincts, No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA (Wash.Super.Ct.,King Co. 3/10/00).  In fact, in Cyber Promotions, 
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.Pa. 1995) it was the sender of spam who sued AOL alleging that 
AOL’s blocking of spam constituted an infringement of First Amendment rights. The court found in favor of AOL, 
reasoning that AOL was not an instrumentality of the government or performed a traditional government function.   
Id.   Similarly, the California and Washington anti-spam email statutes were tested on dormant commerce clause 
grounds and upheld. See Ferguson v. Friendfinder, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255 (Cal. 2002); Washington v. Heckel, 143 
Wn.2d 824 (2001).
158 See e.g., Paul Queary, Redmond Man Wins Big in Spam Case, SEATTLE TIMES, September 11, 2003,  
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2001723719_spam11.html (last visited 
November 30, 2004).
159 See e.g., Chris Ulbricht, Spam Law Generates Confusion, WIRED, January 26, 2004 available at 
www.wired.com (last visited November 30, 2004).
160
 The most significant loophole in the Act arises as a consequence of its overly narrow definition of the spam 
contemplated by the Act; the Act is limited to email only. 15 U.S.C.A. Sect. 7702 (2003). As such, it has already 
failed to be adequately technologically neutral to successfully limit the next generation of spam - malspam.  Though 
a positive step in at least starting a discourse on the issue of spam and ethical marketing practices, the CAN SPAM 
Act will ultimately most likely be of limited effectiveness.  Among its other provisions, the Can Spam Act 
empowers the FTC to create a Do Not Spam registry. 15 U.S.C.A. Sect. 7709 (2003).  This centralized information 
database may become an attractive data harvesting source for spammers if not carefully architected.
161 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hershey Foods Corp., Civ. Action No. 4:03cv350 (M.D. Penn. 2003); U.S. v. Mrs. Fields 
Famous Brands, Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:03 cv205 (D. Ut. 2003); In the Matter of Eli Lilly and Company,  Docket 
No. C-4047, Federal Trade Commission (2002); In the Matter of Microsoft Corporation, File No. 012 3240, Federal 
Trade Commission (2002).
162 Id. 
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conference on the HIPAA privacy rule, stated that HHS will not be aggressive in punishing 
healthcare organizations that violate HIPAA. Campanelli stated that voluntary compliance is the 
most effective way to do implement data security and recommended that the public complain to 
the covered entity about privacy breaches.163  However, as evidenced by the responses of 
information security professionals in the PwC Study, corporate security improves as a 
consequence of fear of prosecution.  Therefore, active enforcement efforts are an important 
component of a successful data security regime.  Simultaneously, however, agency resources for 
enforcement actions are bounded, and the problems of information vulnerability are daunting.  
For example, it is estimated that 15 billion pieces of spam are sent out daily,164 and to date, the 
FTC has prosecuted approximately only approximately 60 individuals and entities for spam
fraud.165  If the FTC’s estimates are correct and approximately 65% of spam is fraudulent,166 the 
scope of the problem appears to be of immense scope and may be outside the ability of even a 
well-funded single government agency to halt. 
The current regulatory approach to information security and the present levels of 
prosecutions for data privacy violations will not adequately address the worsening information 
163 See, e.g., Phoenix Health Care at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/alert/vol4/number2.htm (last visited October 
31, 2004).   Meanwhile, privacy breaches of health records are becoming frequent.  For example, an automated 
probe compromised a computer at Indiana University's Center for Sleep Disorders in November 2003 compromising 
as many as 7,000 patients’ data. Id. . Similarly, about 1.4 million files containing the personal data of patients may 
have been stolen from University of California, Berkeley, during a recent security breach. See Clea Benson, 
Computer data on home care breached, SACRAMENTO BEE, October 20, 2004, at 
http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/medical/story/11152364p-12068658c.html  (last visited February 24, 2005). 
Also incidents have been reported where entities have outsourced work with patient data to entities in other 
countries and received threats of publishing the patient data  on the Web unless the entity pays a “ransom” to 
prevent disclosure of patient records. See e.g., PriceWaterhouse Coopers at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/DocID/67B8EB4D694ACC0685256DE8007EC9F6  (last visited 
February 24, 2005).  This said, the first criminal prosecution under HIPAA was settled in August 2004 in an 
egregious case of patient information theft by an insider who used patient data to obtain credit cards. See U.S. 
Department of Justice at www.us.doj.usao/warypress.room/2004/aug/gibson.htm (last visited November 30, 2004).
164 Id.  at 7. 
165
 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Unsolicited Commercial Email Before the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, U.S. House of Representatives, July 9, 2003, available at 
www.ftc.gov, last visited January 28, 2004.  Most of these enforcement actions involved false content and were 
brought under Section 5 of the Fair Trade Act, alleging that the defendants in question engaged in unfair trade 
practices.  See e.g., FTC v. G. M. Funding, No. SACV 02-1026 DOC (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 2002); FTC v. Brian 
Westby, No. 032-3030 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 15, 2003); FTC v. NetSource One, No. 022-3077 (W.D. Ky. filed Nov. 
2, 2002); FTC v. Cyber Data, No. CV 02-2120 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2002); FTC v. Internet Specialists, No. 
302 CV 01722 RNC (D.Conn. filed Oct. 2002); FTC v. Patrick Cella et al., No. CV-03-3202 (C.D. Cal.) (complaint 
filed May 7, 2003); FTC v. K4 Global Publishing, Inc. et al., No. 5:03-CV0140-3 (M.D. Ga.) (complaint filed May 
7, 2003);  FTC v. Clickformail.com, Inc., No. 03-C-3033 (N.D. Ill.) (complaint filed May 7, 2003).
166
 Federal Trade Commission, False Claims in Spam, 4, April 30, 2003 available at www.ftc.gov , last visited 
January 28, 2004.
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security crisis.  A new approach is needed to buttress existing legal information security 
structures. The subsequent sections present one such new approach.167
II. Understanding Information Security Regulation in a Complex System
Despite the efforts of Congress and the Federal Trade Commission set forth in the previous 
section, the severity of the information security crisis is increasing.  Part of the reason for this 
worsened state of information security rests in two suboptimal properties of the current 
regulatory approach: (1) the adoption of an ineffectual paradigm of “security through obscurity”
and (2) a lack of leveraging the dynamic structural properties of networks.  
First, the security paradigm adopted by the corporate information security statutes described 
in the preceding section is predicated on a concept known in the technology community as 
“security through obscurity,” which has been generally discredited as an effective security 
paradigm.168 This paradigm should be rejected in favor of a paradigm based on process and 
greater transparency.  Second, the current regulatory approach imperfectly conceptualizes the 
manner in which information systems must be structured for maximizing security, and it 
inadequately considers the manner in which networks transmit information most effectively –
through hubs. Even assuming that regulation has adopted a less than ideal paradigm, if the 
economic hubs of our society have adopted a good security paradigm, better security will 
eventually filter through the system.  In such a case, correcting the legislative imperfection may, 
arguably, not be necessary. Consequently, an empirical analysis of security disclosure practices 
of economic hubs, publicly traded companies, was undertaken to assess the information security 
paradigm being adopted by these entities in their operations.  The entities in the sample were also 
found to have adopted the suboptimal paradigm of “security through obscurity,” rather than the 
superior paradigm of “security through process.”  This leads to the conclusion that information 
security learning is not adequately emerging in the private sector and entities need regulatory 
assistance in teaching themselves to be more vigilant in their information security practices.
167
 For a discussion of the current state of criminal computer intrusion statutes see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1596 (2003). See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003).
168 See, e.g., Hyperdictionary at http://www.hyperdictionary.com/computing/security+through+obscurity (last 
visited November 29, 2004).
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A. Adopting Kerckhoff’s Law and a Network-Wide Process-Based Security Regulation 
Paradigm
The initial critical step to correcting the information security crisis is simultaneously securing 
the most vulnerable points in the economy while raising the average level of information security 
throughout our economy as a whole.  Though the current statutory approaches attempt to address 
some of the most vulnerable points, they neglect to consider the system as a whole or to provide 
a means of monitoring progress in security practices.  Therefore, it can be argued that Congress 
has erroneously adopted the information security and cryptography paradigm of “security 
through obscurity” as the dominant regulatory paradigm in information security legislation.  This 
paradigm should be replaced with a paradigm based on “security through process,” in particular
considering the dynamics of information transfer in networks. 
1. Rejecting Security Through Obscurity as a Regulatory Paradigm
As described in the preceding sections, Congress has been active in legislating improved 
corporate information security practices.  Although the current statutory frameworks in place 
provide a good starting point for working to remedy the information security crisis, they will not 
prove adequate by themselves.  The reason existing statutes will prove inadequate stems from 
their faulty premises: the current legal approach to data security regulation is unconsciously 
predicated on an information security paradigm now widely discredited in the information 
security and cryptography community169 called “security through obscurity.” 
a. Defining Security Through Obscurity
“Security through obscurity” is the idea that adequate security should be driven by the 
subjective beliefs of the owners of a system regarding the security of that system.  Therefore, if 
the owners believe that particular security flaws of the system are not widely known or 
inconsequential, then it must be the case that attackers are unlikely to find and exploit them as 
169
“Security through obscurity” is discredited in the tech community. See, e.g., University of California at 
Irvine at www.isr.uci.edu/projects/swrl/ (last visited November 29, 2004).
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long as the owners keep information about the vulnerabilities secret. 170 In other words, 
technological knowledge of the owners of the system is presumed to be superior to that of 
hackers under the paradigm of “security through obscurity,” and it is presumed that hackers are 
not skilled enough to acquire the requisite knowledge of vulnerabilities in the system
independently.  Consequently, a “security through obscurity” legislative paradigm presumes that 
no regular public accountability mechanisms for security are necessary because owners will, for 
the most part, be vigilant about securing their systems.  Therefore, the principle of “security 
through obscurity” is, in the best case, based on the notion that entities act inherently responsibly
with regard to information security and can be trusted to correct any known flaws on their own.
However, in the worst case, “security through obscurity” means that if no one discusses a 
security vulnerability publicly, it can be ignored by an entity and not remedied.
The current statutory regime adopts this paradigm of “security through obscurity.”  Although 
information security statutes mandate that corporations take action to protect collected 
information, particularly consumer information, no provisions create public accountability 
mechanisms, aside from statutorily empowering the Federal Trade Commission and other 
agencies to institute regulatory action.  In practice, in several cases in the last five years FTC 
prosecutions of vulnerable entities were the result of direct or indirect tips from hackers
themselves171 because these tips are frequently the only information available.  Obviously, such 
a system is a highly unsystematic mechanism at best with questionable ethical implications.  
Information gathering about potential breaches of security is labor and cost intensive, and 
monitoring companies’ security practices on an ongoing basis is a practical impossibility even 
for a well-funded security-specific agency, something which the FTC is not.  Further, in light of 
severely constrained agency resources, only a small number of regulatory actions will be 
brought.  Therefore, the current regulatory approach essentially relies on the idea that entities 
will keep their information secure in undisclosed ways and that they will behave responsibly to 
ensure vulnerabilities are fixed.  
170 See, e.g., Brainy Encyclopedia at 
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/s/se/security_through_obscurity.html (last visited November 29, 
2004).
171
 In fact, an interesting symbiosis is emerging between white hat hackers and the FTC.  White hats’ tips on 
data leaks have in several instances directly resulted in subsequent FTC prosecution of the entities.  See, e.g.,  Kevin 
Poulsen, Petco Settle with FTC over Cybersecurity Gaffe, SECURITYFOCUS, November 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9957 (last visited November 30, 2004).
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b.  Why Legislative Adoption of a “Security Through Obscurity” Paradigm is 
Misguided
A legislative approach premised on the paradigm of “security through obscurity” ignores the 
realities of the business world: as articulated by information technology professionals 
themselves, it is fear of liability that catalyzes their companies’ improvements in information 
security.  Companies are unlikely to choose to comply to the best of their ability with legislation 
they perceive to be unclear and onerous, particularly when they are not required to provide any 
evidence of compliance.172 If companies are allowed to keep all security-related information 
secret and no disclosure of security failures is statutorily required from entities,173 the risk of 
prosecution remains low.  Therefore, investing in security is, rather logically, not viewed by 
many entities as a wise allocation of scarce corporate resources in the short term. Also, 
particularly for entities that are not in the technology sector, the requisite knowledge of 
information technology to construct more secure corporate information systems and processes is 
not necessarily available in-house.  Hiring additional staff or obtaining the requisite security 
training for current staff will result in extra costs.  In other words, it can be argued that the 
current legislative approach which enables secrecy makes it is more cost effective in the short 
term for entities to make privacy promises that they are only somewhat concerned about 
breaching and to table investments in information security education and improvement until such 
time as the legal incentive structure changes.174
Further, “security through obscurity” hinges upon the idea that companies are capable of 
keeping secret information about vulnerabilities in their systems.  However, this idea greatly 
underestimates the skills of hackers, a critical error. It also ignores the complexities of hacker 
172
 Companies think current regulation is unclear and onerous.  See, e.g., Joseph Goedert,  HIPAA Compliance 
Strategies, available at http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/current/CurrentIssueStory.cfm?PostID=12312
(last visited November 30, 2004). See also, e.g., Dean William Harvey, Amy White, The Impact of Computer 
Security Regulation on American Companies, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 505 (2002)
173
 Although COPPA, HIPAA and GLBA require privacy statements, an entity’s history of security gaffes and 
technological compliance with its stated privacy practices are not readily available in any centralized place for 
consumers to access.  Most consumers will not know to look through the articles of, e.g., SecurityFocus, available at 
http://www.securityfocus.com (last visited January 16, 2005).
174
 This is not to assert that no one in business entities cares about information security, because, in fact, the 
opposite is frequently true.  Conceptualizing a business entity as a single actor with a single voice and agenda does 
not accurately reflect the dynamic nature of corporate environments.  However, security-conscious information 
technology professionals frequently have difficulty in internally selling the idea of allocating resources to corporate 
information security; the incentives for this investment are low in the short run under the current legislative 
approach and many other groups within entities do not grasp the long term business benefits of good information 
security practices.
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culture; some hackers work as information security professionals by day and hack into systems 
by night or shift back and forth between the private sector and independent hacking.175
Disclosure of vulnerabilities is not always within entities’ control.  For example, some security 
breaches are perpetrated by hackers expressly for reputational and other nonpecuniary benefits –
no financial incentives are necessarily involved.  Therefore, hackers frequently openly discuss 
their exploits and the identities of vulnerable entities.176  Consequently, even if the company 
attempts to prevent leakage of information regarding a penetration, it will not always be 
successful.  Entities perpetually run the risk of negative reputational consequences because of a 
breach and the risk of other hackers replicating a breach. 
In the long run, of course, the calculus is (or should be) completely different. A decision by 
an entity to short-change corporate information security is obviously undesirable in the long term 
not only for society as a whole,177 but also for the entity itself. A critical component of an 
entity’s strategy to maximize share value for the benefit of shareholders is protecting its 
proprietary information. Investing corporate resources in developing new proprietary intangible 
assets without adequately protecting them reflects poor risk management planning at best and, 
arguably, corporate waste in its lease generous characterization.   The legal regime which 
encourages corporate secrecy through the “security through obscurity” model simultaneously 
encourages officers to erroneously focus on the short-term profit maximization in the area of 
information security strategy.   A better legal paradigm is one which helps entities guide their 
own long-term information security planning; the current “security through obscurity” legislative 
approach fails on this front encouraging secrecy rather than thoughtful risk management.
175
  For an introduction to hacker culture, see, e.g., The Mentor, The Conscience of a Hacker, available at 
http://www.insecure.org/stf/hacker_manifesto.html (last visited January 17, 2005); DOUGLAS THOMAS, HACKER 
CULTURE (2002); Eric Steven Raymond, How to Become a Hacker, available at 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/hacker-howto.html (last visited January 17, 2005).  
176
 Declan McCullagh, Homeless Hacker Surrenders, CNET, September 9, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1009_3-5073426.html?part=msnbc-cnet (last visited November 30, 2004).
177
 Information security presents a problem that can be conceptualized as a type of short-term collective action 
problem:  it is a case where entities have a choice between two alternatives and where, if they acted strictly 
rationally in the economic sense, the outcome will be worse for all, in their own estimation, than it would be if they 
were all to choose the other alternative.  If every entity invested significant amounts of resources in information 
security in the short term, information crime would likely drop in the system as a whole. However, the current 
financial incentives in the short term encourage entities to free-ride.  However, the long-term benefits of information 
security improvements present an entirely different calculus.  For a discussion of collective action problems see, 
e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE (1986).
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c. An Alternative Approach:  “Security Through Process” and Kerckhoff’s 
Law
The discussion above may seem to support the argument that imposing large fines on certain 
companies to make examples of them, striking fear in the hearts of other entities, may be the best 
route to improving information security in the system as a whole.  After all, if entities respond 
only to fear of liability, then perhaps expectations and fears of liability should simply be 
generated.  Impositions of liability for egregious lack of care in information security may, in fact,
be appropriate in some instances.  However, even assuming that a critical mass of large awards 
and fines punishing the vulnerable will bring about the desired improvements in security, as a 
practical matter, all judicial and regulatory proceedings take time, frequently years, from the 
point of filing to judgment.  In the interim, the information security crisis will exponentially 
worsen.  Therefore, simply relying on the development of this body of law is inadequate.  If 
entities are not already moving toward constructing more secure systems of their own volition, a
stop gap measure is needed to incentivize improvements in corporate information security in the 
short term while this body of information security caselaw develops.178 Perhaps our legal 
approaches should scaffold179 entities in their development toward responsible information 
security risk management, assisting them in learning how to hold themselves accountable to their 
shareholders for information security.
Therefore, instead of endorsing “security through obscurity,” our legal regime should 
endorse a paradigm where corporate accountability for information security to shareholders and 
society becomes part of regular corporate process.   This suggestion to shift from a legal model 
of “security through obscurity” to “security through process” mirrors the evolution of modern 
information security and cryptography theory.  Modern information security and cryptography 
theory, having rejected “security through obscurity,” embraced systems structured in line with 
Kerckhoffs’ Law. 
178
 For example, a body of information security negligence caselaw is slowly emerging.  See, e.g., Foster ex 
rel.J.L. v. Hillcrest Baptist Medical Center, 2004 WL 254713 (Tex.App. – Waco 2004) (Health data security 
breached by a medical center); Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 292 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2002) (Release 
of employee health data in connection with benefits plan administration); American Express Travel Related 
Services, Co., Inc. v. Symbiont Software Group, Inc., et al., 837 So.2d 434 (Fla.3d D. 2002), rev. denied 851 So.2d 
729 (Fla. 2003) (Customer financial information breached by a point-of-sale software manufacturer).
179 See note 12 supra.
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Kerckhoff’s Law asserts that the correct way to construct systems is to constantly test their 
security by assuming that almost all information about the system is public. 180  In other words, it 
is an “open” paradigm not predicated on total secrecy.  It presumes that many different eyes are 
going to test the security of the system and that some of these “testers” may have skills as good 
as or superior to those of the creators of the security in the system.  Therefore, almost complete 
disclosure of the operation of security in the system is presumed because attackers are assumed 
to be as astute as the technologists who constructed the security system.181  Kerkhoff’s Law, 
unlike “security through obscurity,” correctly conceptualizes the severity of information risk 
from malicious third parties. Upon discovery of vulnerability, the system evolves to correct for 
these holes, knowing the holes will be quickly exploited again if it does not.  In other words, in 
this “security through process” model, security is conceptualized as an ongoing relatively 
transparent, open process of construction, vetting, reconfiguration and correction of weaknesses 
in information security.  Unlike “security through obscurity,” “security through process”
recognizes that no entity can maintain complete control over knowledge of its information 
security vulnerabilities.
A regulatory paradigm that mandates open dialog and creates a definitive legal process for 
analysis of corporate information security risks, successes and failures presents a superior legal 
paradigm.  Corporate information security will not be compromised through openly discussing 
issues of information security management. Although entities may suffer vulnerabilities in 
different ways, entities with strong information security practices tend to have much in common 
in the way they structure their systems.  In fact, technologists in various entities frequently share 
information about information security challenges they face. However, discussions about these 
challenges within entities, particularly with legal departments and upper management, are few 
according to the PwC Study.  Therefore, a regulatory approach that requires participation of
these groups of corporate decisionmakers outside the information technology department will 
180
  Bruce Schneier extends Kerckhoff to stand for the proposition that all security systems must be designed to 
fail as gracefully as possible: Kerckhoffs' principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: 
every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore 
something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility. See 
Charles C. Mann, Homeland Insecurity available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200209/mann (last visited 
February 24, 2005); See also, BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 
(2000)
181
 This rationale of openness forms the seminal theoretical underpinnings of the open source movement as well.  
See, e.g., Erik Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, available at http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/ cathedral-
bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ (last visited January 17, 2005).
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stimulate internal corporate discourse on topics of information security.  Similarly, a successful 
regulatory approach will encourage shareholders to hold officers accountable for prudent 
information security in the same manner officers are accountable to shareholders, for example, 
for prudently managing the tangible assets of the entity.  Improving information security is in 
entities’ own best interest; regulation can be used to help them to understand this interest and to 
make them realize that information security risks are risks that every entity faces, much like the 
risk of bankruptcy of a key customer or supplier.  
A successful regulatory approach predicated on Kerckhoff’s Law would require that entities 
set up an open process of disclosure and discourse of information security risks, failures and 
successes, both internally and externally.  Entities would shift away from a mindset of secrecy 
and a short-term security cost-benefit calculus to a long term perspective that views security as 
an ongoing, entity-wide process throughout the life of the entity. In particular, a successful 
regulatory approach will require that information security risk management be considered by the 
officers of the entity as a regular part of the strategic planning process.  Such a regulatory 
approach may result in greater information security improvements in a shorter time frame than 
an approach that relies solely on entities’ fear of liability.  Similarly, because external reporting 
regarding information security practices would occur, ongoing oversight of information security 
management by both shareholders and appropriate agencies becomes greatly simplified.
2. Scale-Free Networks and Information Security
Our current legal approach to information security lacks both adequate transparency and 
adequate consideration of the manner in which the properties of information transfer in networks 
impact information security regulation.  To this end, complexity theory182 holds lessons for 
182
 Complexity, in general, is the science examining the interrelationship, interaction and interconnectivity of 
various elements within a system and between a system and the environment in which it exists. The hallmarks of 
complex adaptive systems are distributed control, connectivity, co-evolution, sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions, emergent order, a state not in equilibrium, and a paradoxical condition of both order and chaos.  See, e.g, 
MITCHELL RESNICK, TURTLES, TERMITES AND TRAFFIC JAMS (1997); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW 
ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); Serena Chan, Complex Adaptive Systems, at 
http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.pdf (last visited May 2, 2004). 
However, the exact contours of complexity theory vary discipline to discipline.  For an overview of twenty different 
views on complexity theory see Joseph Sussman, Ideas on Complexity in Systems – Twenty Views, available at 
http://esd.mit.edu/WPS/esd-wp-2000-02.html (last visited August 29, 2004). 
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corporate law, generally, and for addressing the information security183 crisis, specifically.184
Regulation aimed to improve information security throughout a system must be crafted with an 
awareness of the system’s organizational code,185 the emerging dynamic structural properties of 
the system, and the impact of legal emergence on information security practices.186 In other 
183
 The version of complexity espoused here may reject in part several key assumptions of traditional 
neoclassical economics, including the possibility of perfect information and the notion of corporations acting with a 
single rational voice.  Corporations are more accurately conceptualized as networks of individuals with bounded 
rationality which are aggregated into dynamic, nonlinear systems engaged in information transfer and development 
within a particular social context.  Human agency can shape social systems to generate short term predictability, but 
long term predictability is not possible. See, e.g., David Levy, Applications and Limitations of Complexity Theory in 
Organizational Theory and Strategy in JACK RABIN, GERALD MILLER, W BARTLEY HILDRETH, HANDBOOK OF 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (2000); David Levy, Chaos Theory and Strategy: Theory, Application, management 
Implications, 15 Strategic Management Journal 167 (1994). For further discussion of complexity theory, see, e.g., Y. 
BAR-YAM, DYNAMICS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS: STUDIES IN NONLINEARITY (1997);  ALBERTO LASZLO BARABASI, 
LINKED (2002).  
184
 For various applications of complex systems theory to other legal contexts see, e.g., David G. Post and David 
R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Toward a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-making in 
Complex Systems, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (arguing that legal theory would be enriched by paying 
attention to algorithms derived from the study of complex systems in contexts such as competitive federalism and 
the “patching” algorithm). See also, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT.L. J. 603 (2003); Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 
10 B.U.J.SCI & TECH. L. 1 (2004); Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV.
1017 (2004); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 495 (2004); Scott H. Hughes, Understanding Conflict in a Postmodern World, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); 
Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 145 (2003); Erica Beecher-Monas, Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent 
Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.1848 (2003); J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman, Mozart and the 
Queen:  The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); Daniel S. 
Goldberg, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of 
Textualism and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L.REV. 463 (2002); Thomas R. McClean, Application of Administrative Law 
to Health Care Reform: The Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 16 J. L. & HEALTH 65 (2001-2002); James 
Salzman, J.B. Ruhl, Kai-Sheng Song, Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253 (2002); Jeffrey G. Miller, 
Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L.REV. 409 (2000); Patricia A. 
Martin, Bioethics and the Whole Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold, 27 
J.L.MED. & ETHICS 316 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: 
Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L.& POL’Y F. 161 (1999); Thomas Earl Geu, 
Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the 
Millennium, 66 TENN. L.REV.137 (1998); Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty and 
“Reasonable Medical Certainty,” 57 MD.L.REV. 380 (1998);  J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity 
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
1407 (1996); Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and 
Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996).  
185
 For a discussion of what I call “architectures of growth” see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured 
Protection: Development of Relational Internet and Privacy Contracting Norms in Margaret RADIN ET AL, (EDS.),  
SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE (2005)(forthcoming, on file with author).
186
 Legal emergence refers to the manner in which behavioral norms of various legal and business actors 
spontaneously self organize to form a dynamic organizational code that circumscribes future legal strategies.   Early 
theoretical discussion of spontaneous self ordering can be found in Hayek.   See e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD 
TO SERFDOM (1944). Law and legal norms are part of this web of mutual causation within a system, which I have 
elsewhere called “organizational code.” For a discussion of organizational code see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of 
Nodes and Power Laws:  A Network Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction through Data Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. 
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words, law and people do not exist in a vacuum; it is important to consider how the dynamic 
properties of information transfer in networks influence legal behaviors and their evolution.  
Applying this analytical lens of legal emergence187 to the current regulatory paradigm, it 
becomes clear that current approaches to information security regulation erroneously adopt what 
might be termed a “clustering”188 approach to controlling information transfer.  Thus, they have 
incorrectly conceptualized how to generate viral spread of good information security practices in 
the system and how to mitigate the transitive nature of information risk. 
a. Rejecting a Clustering Approach 
The current approach to information security exemplified by statutes such as COPPA, 
HIPAA, and GLBA attempts to regulate information security through creating legal “clusters” of 
entities based on the type of business they transact, the types of data they control, as well as the 
data’s permitted and nonpermitted uses. In other words, the current regulatory approach has 
singled out a few points in the system that engage in business data transfers for creating enclaves 
of information security, points that engage in transfer of children’s data, health information,189
and financial data.190 Although addressing the particularly sensitive nature of children’s data, 
health data, and financial data through regulation is a positive step toward improving corporate 
information security of a few clusters of entities, it is by itself insufficient to improve 
information security in the system as a whole.  
Rev. 493 (2004). Organizational code includes both market and nonmarket strategic decisions of actors within the 
complex adaptive system.  For a discussion of nonmarket strategy see, e.g., S.L. Jarvenpaa, E. H. Tiller, Integrating 
market, technology, and policy opportunities in e-business strategy, 8 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 235 (1999).   
187
 Emergence, generally, is order that arises from the interactions of individual actors within a complex system, 
demonstrating a global pattern that could not have been forecast simply from understanding the behavior of one 
particular actor.  See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES AND 
SOFTWARE (2001).  
188
 For discussion of clustering behaviors in a complex system, see, e.g., Cees van Leeuwen, Ionel Simionescu, 
Robustness and Consistency of Dynamic Clustering of Complex Systems, available at 
http://pdl.brain.riken.go.jp/publications/published/van_Leeuwen__Simionescu_Connection_Science_2002.pdf (last 
visited January 17, 2005).
189
 HIPAA restricts its scope to “covered” entities that handle personally identifiable health information, such as 
hospitals and insurance companies.  Thus, not all sharing of health data necessarily falls under HIPAA.
190
 GLBA addressed financial information held by “financial institutions” as defined by GLBA. 
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The current approach ignores the fundamental tenet of security that a system is only as strong 
as its weakest links, not its strongest points.191 Therefore, because this lowest common security 
denominator determines the security of the system as a whole, the better approach to controlling 
information throughout the system is to ensure that the least secure points in the system are 
strengthened and that the average level of security is as high as possible throughout the system.
It will not prove adequate to only ensure that a few points or clusters in the system are 
particularly well-secured.  
Also, much of information crime does not involve any of the data deemed particularly 
“sensitive” by statute at present, and many entities that aggregate large amounts of information 
do not fall into any of the categories of business entities currently regulated by information 
security statutes. The biggest economic losses are arising not out of illegal leveraging of these 
protected categories of data. Losses are arising out of stolen personally identifiable information 
such as credit card data and social security numbers, which are warehoused frequently by entities 
that are not regulated by COPPA, HIPAA or GLBA.  Therefore, creating enclaves of superior 
data security for data related to children online, some financial information and some health data 
will not alleviate the weak information security in other parts of the system and will not 
substantially diminish information crime.  Consequently, the goal of successful information 
security regulation will be to focus on the system as a whole and expeditiously improve the 
weakest and average information security behaviors of all entities within the system, not merely 
that of clusters within the system.
b. Adopting a Focus on Transitive Closure, Hubs, and Nodes
The current regulatory approach also does not correctly consider the transitive nature of 
information risk.  Saying that risks associated with information security are transitive means that
if an entity shares sensitive corporate information with a business partner and that partner
experiences a data leakage that includes the shared data, the negative effects to the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data are similar to those that would have occurred if the
original entity had been breached itself.  Stated another way, each time an entity shares data, it 
takes a dependency on another entity.  HIPAA and GLBA attempt to recognize this transitivity 
191
 Security systems only as good as weakest point. See, e.g., Gary McGraw, John Vega, The chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link, available at http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/s-link.html (last 
visited November 30, 2004).
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of risk by requiring that entities who share statutorily protected data contractually impose data 
care obligations on to their immediate trusted business partners.  In this manner, stronger 
information security practices will presumably be transferred to the immediate business partners 
of entities subject to HIPAA and GLBA, These immediate business partners might be termed the 
“neighborhood” of an entity.  In other words, the entire neighborhood of HIPAA and GLBA 
compliant entities adopts a stronger focus on information security.  
Although this approach is a good starting point, the more appropriate scope of encouraging 
viral spread of security practices is the “transitive closure”192 of entities rather than merely 
entities’ neighborhood.  The transitive closure of an entity in the context of information security 
encompasses not only the added information risk from an entity’s trusted partners but the also 
the risks from the partners of those partners and onward, following the chain of possession of the 
data end to end. The transitive closure of an entity is the proper scope of consideration and not 
the neighborhood.  Even if an entity’s immediate business partners maintain strong security in 
connection with shared data, if one of those business partners makes one unwise outsourcing 
decision and gives access to the shared data to a third entity with weak security, the 
consequences of a data breach by this vulnerable entity two steps removed will be felt by the 
initial entity.  The harm occurs regardless of the fact that the initial entity never directly chose 
the vulnerable entity as a business partner. Thus, the entire path of transfer of the data and the 
attendant risks are included in the risk calculus; the transitive closure is the entire group of 
entities whose information security practices can impact the security of the data at issue.
Further, the current statutory framework treats all entities dealing in particular types of data 
as presenting an equal security risk to the system as a whole.  This is inaccurate.  Not all business 
entities within our economy are equal in size, success or connectedness with the public or with 
other business entities; some entities are disproportionately more important to our economy as a 
whole than others.  Thus, if the goal is to build a system of information security throughout the 
economy as quickly as possible, the best and most critical entities to enlist in improving security 
throughout the economy are those with the greatest number of connections to other entities and 
the largest transitive closures, the hubs of our economy.
192 Transitive closure refers to all points reachable from a particular point in a network, directly or indirectly, 
whose behavior impacts the behavior and risk profile of the initial point. See, e.g., Robert Kozma,, Why Transitive 
Closure is Important, available at http://www.msci.memphis.edu/~kozmar/web-t_alg_n11-2.ppt (last visited 
November 30, 2004).
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This type of structure where some points in a system are more critical to the integrity of the 
system and more connected is a scale-free network. 193  In a scale-free network topology, a hub 
and node structure is visible where hubs are points connected to a significantly greater number of 
points than most others points, which are mere nodes.194  Hubs are more stable than nodes, and 
their elimination negatively impacts the survival of network as a whole to a greater degree than 
the elimination of a mere node.   The way that information transfers most quickly in a scale-free 
network is through transmission from hubs195 outward to nodes.  Hubs have the greatest number 
of “edges” or connections with other points in the network, therefore more entities can be 
reached simultaneously.  Infusing hubs results in transfer throughout the system more rapidly 
than it would from infusing a node. Similarly, because the transitive closure of hubs is generally 
larger than the transitive closure of nodes, the number of nodes that can be reached from a given 
point in the system, is higher in the case of hubs.
It is fair to say that our securities laws and business realities have created a structure where 
publicly traded companies are the “hubs” of economic exchange in our economy.   Publicly 
traded companies are most interconnected with both other companies and citizens in our society; 
as large entities, they frequently amass significant databases of consumer information which they 
can leverage in the marketplace and owe special duties to the public, their shareholders.
Investors’ and marketmakers’ perceptions of public companies’ corporate conduct are critical to 
the stability of the stock markets and our economy.  Also, publicly traded companies tend to 
have more assets than private companies, and small entities frequently perceive doing business 
with a public company as a more attractive business choice than doing business with a private 
entity.  Consequently, the most efficient manner of raising the level of information security 
within the network of our economy is through its hubs.
193
  A burgeoning literature in economics and the physical sciences discusses the structures of market and 
economic activity as demonstrating properties of scale-free networks.  See, e.g., Jan Matlis, Scale-Free Networks, 
available at http://www.computerworld.com/networkingtopics/networking/story/0,10801,75539,00.html (last visited 
January 17, 2005; H.-J. Kim and I.-M. Kim, Scale-Free Network in Stock Markets, 40 JOURNAL OF THE KOREAN 
PHYSICAL SOCIETY 1105 (2002), available at http://phya.snu.ac.kr/~kahng/econo.pdf (last visited January 17, 2005);  
Diego Garlaschelli, Stefano Battiston, Maurizio Castri, Vito D. P. Servedio, and Guido Caldarelli,The scale-free 
topology of market investments, available at http://www.lps.ens.fr/~battiston/SF_TopoShareNets.pdf  (last visited 
January 17, 2005).
194 See, e.g., M. E. J. NEWMAN, A. L. BARABASI, AND D. J. WATTS (EDS). THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF 
COMPLEX NETWORKS (2003); D. J. WATTS. SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003); D. J. WATTS. 
SMALL WORLDS: THE DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS BETWEEN ORDER AND RANDOMNESS (1999).
195
 For example, extensive work has been done on the spread of disease through social networks.  See, e.g., 
Christofer Edling, Fredrik Liljeros, Social Contact Patterns and Disease Dynamics, available at 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/103/103.pdf (last visited February 24, 2005).
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Therefore, the next section empirically explores the state of information security behaviors of 
the hubs of our economy, publicly traded companies, through a primary communication 
mechanism with the market and with their shareholders, annual reports.  This inquiry aims to 
assess whether public companies have already adopted the “security through process” approach 
to information security.  If they have done so, good information security practices are likely 
starting to virally spread through the economy and revising current information security 
legislation to reflect a “security through process” paradigm may not be necessary as a practical 
matter. If meaningful disclosure of information security risks is occurring, it is likely that 
entities are successfully learning the importance of strong information security: prudent entities 
will use the process of annual report filings to self-assess their practices and disclose the severity 
of the information security risks they face to their shareholders.196 If this type of disclosure is 
occurring, it is possible that good information security practices are already filtering through the 
system and perhaps no additional regulatory efforts are needed after all.  However, if no 
meaningful disclosure is occurring, it is likely that entities, like current legislation, are adopting 
the inferior paradigm of “security through obscurity.”  In other words, they are not adequately 
contemplating and risk managing the security of their systems, a result in line with the findings
of the PwC Study.   As such, if this is the case, without addition of a second layer to current 
regulation, good information security will not virally expand throughout the system, and
inadequate corporate information security self-auditing and inadequate transparency mechanisms
for external auditing will persist.  Consequently, the information security crisis will also continue 
to worsen. 
B. Assessing the “Hubs’” Approach to Information Security:  Corporate  
Information Security Disclosure Practices in 10K filings
As discussed in the previous sections, Congress has statutorily articulated a social priority
of stimulating more responsible corporate conduct in information security. This section next 
undertakes an inquiry into what corporations are saying, or not saying, regarding the information 
196
 Public companies would do so both to advise shareholders of the existence of security risks and to protect 
the entity from potential regulatory action by the SEC for failing to disclose what may be a material risk. Publicly 
traded entities are required to disclose material risks they face in their businesses as part of their securities reporting, 
in particular in annual 10K filings.  For a discussion of risk factor disclosure see e.g., Alan K. Austin Steven V. 
Bernard, Risk Factors Disclosure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1451 PLI/CORP 747 (2004).
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security risks they face.  Disclosures of information security practices by a publicly traded entity 
in its 10K filings, aside from being prudent risk management, also indicates adoption of a 
paradigm of “security through process.”  They further demonstrate that the entity is conscious of 
and conducts analyses of the information security risks it faces. More broadly, in the aggregate, 
these disclosures speak to the extent to which improving information security is being 
incorporated into corporate behavior by the entities critical to the stability of our economy as a 
whole.   The inquiry involved an empirical longitudinal analysis of 120 publicly traded 
companies’ 10K annual securities filings across 5 years time to analyze the dominant security 
paradigm adopted by the entities in the sample and the extent of information security disclosure 
occurring.   
1. The Inquiry in Brief
A content analysis of the 10K filings of 120 publicly traded companies from 1999, Time 
1, and the most recent filing,197 Time 2, was performed to examine the relationship among the 
extent of information security risk disclosure and certain characteristics of each entity.   
Specifically, the level of information security disclosure of each entity in the sample was 
assessed in relation to whether each entity was a technology company, the novelty of the entity, 
the number of employees, whether the entity has a history of prosecution for security breaches, 
whether the entity has a publicized history of vulnerabilities, whether the entity’s business is 
data-intensive in nature, and the influence of prior information disclosure patterns.  
The results of the inquiry demonstrated that less than half of the sample engaged in any 
information security disclosure in their 10K filings at Time 2.  Increased information security 
disclosure at Time 2 tended to be associated with technology sector companies, companies with 
a history of prosecution, and companies which had disclosed information security risks at Time 
1.
2. Hypotheses
It was hypothesized that:
(1) Because of the greater likelihood of having in-house information security experts, 
entities in the technology sector would be more likely to understand the implications 
197
 As of August 2004.
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of information security vulnerability and, consequently, to engage in security 
disclosure at Time 2 than entities whose primary business is not technology related. 
(2) Newer entities will be more likely to disclose than older entities because they may be 
more attune to the role of information systems in their enterprise.
(3) Entities with more employees would be more likely to engage in security disclosure 
at Time 2 than entities with fewer employees because employees are a key source of 
information vulnerability.
(4) Entities that have been prosecuted by the FTC or have defended against privacy suits 
would be more likely to engage in security disclose than entities who have not been 
prosecuted or been defendants at Time 2.
(5) Entities with a history of security vulnerability and data breaches would be more 
likely to engage in disclosure than entities without such a history at Time 2 because 
they may better understand the risks of information vulnerability than entities without 
a history of vulnerability.
(6) Entities with data intensive businesses would be more likely to disclose information 
security risks than entities that are not data intensive because data-intensive entities 
are more attractive information crime targets.
(7) Entities engaging in information security disclosure at Time 1 will be more likely to 
engage in disclosure at Time 2
3. Sample
The sample consisted of the 10K annual filings of 120 publicly traded companies198 at 
two points in time,  Time 1, 1999, and Time 2, each entity’s most recent 10K.   Specifically, the 
198
 Acxiom Corp.,  Amazon.com Inc., America West Holdings Corp., AMR Corporation, American Express 
Co., Wyeth, aQuantive.com, Inc., Barnes and Noble, Inc., Chase Manhattan Company, Choicepoint, Inc., Delta
Airlines, Inc., DoubleClick Inc., eBay Inc., Eli Lilly and Comany, Fleet National Bank, Guess, Inc., Hershey Foods 
Corporation, Intuit Inc., Looksmart Ltd., Microsoft Corporation, Northwest Airlines, Inc., Ohio Art Company, 
Pfizer, Inc., Sabre Holdings, Time Warner Companies, Inc., Toys R” Us, Inc., United Online, Inc., Verizon
Communications Inc., Limited Brands, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., Agilent Technologies, Inc., American Standard 
Companies Inc, Baxter International, Cerner Corp., Citrix Systems, Inc., Coherent Inc., Computer Network 
Technology, Computer Task Group Inc., CSX Corporation, Electronic Data Systems Corp., Digital Impact, Inc., 
Eastman Kodak Co., Electronic Arts, Inc., Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp., Gateway Inc., Hanover 
International, Plc., Harris Interactive Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, Hyperion Solutions Corporation, Intel
Corporation, Keane Inc., Kendle International Inc., Merck & Co., Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, Procter and 
Gamble Company, Red Hat Inc., Staples Inc., Sybase Inc., Walgreens Co., WellMed, Inc., Apple Computer, Inc., 
AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Bank of America Corporation, Bank One Corporation, BJs Wholesale Club, Inc., 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
51
sample consisted of four groups of entities:  (1) 30 entities that have either been prosecuted by 
the Federal Trade Commission for their privacy and security practices or have been the subject 
of civil class action suits from consumers on the basis of their privacy and security practices;199
(2) 30 entities known to have suffered significant data security breaches but were not subject to 
FTC prosecution or consumer class action suit;200 (3) 30 entities which have not been subject to 
FTC prosecution or consumer suit and have not suffered publicized significant data breaches, but 
are likely to be attractive targets for malicious actors in light of the consumer data-intensive 
nature of the business;201 and (4) a comparison group of entities which are not consumer data-
intensive and do not have a known history of data prosecution or vulnerability.202
4. Measures
a.  Dependent Variable: Level of Disclosure at Time 2
Level of disclosure at Time 2 refers to the score of each entity in the sample on the 
Information Security Securities Disclosure Scale.203
b.  Independent Variables
Cisco Systems, Inc., CitiBank NA, Compaq Computer Corporation, Continental Airlines, Inc., Morgan Stanley 
(Discover)., Echostar Communications, Inc. (Dish Network), EarthLink, Inc., e*Trade Financial Corporation, Ford 
Motor Credit Corp., Gannett Co. Inc., General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Ingram Micro Inc., Interland, Inc., 
International Business Machines Corporation, Knight-Ridder, Inc., Lowe's Companies, MBNA Corporation, New 
York Times Co., Oracle Corporation, Playboy Enterprises Inc., PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., Symantec,
Corp., U.S. Bancorp, Viacom, Inc., Wells Fargo & Company, AK Steel Holding Corp., Alcoa, Inc., Ameron 
International Corporation, AptarGroup Inc., Ball Corporation, Bemis Company, Inc., Boise Cascade Corporation, 
Bowater Inc., Carpenter Technology Corp., Chesapeake Corporation, Commercial Metals Company, Crown 
Holdings Inc., Deltic Timber Corporation, Eagle Materials, Inc.,  Georgia Pacific Corporation, Lockheed Martin
Corporation, Longview Fibre Co., Louisiana Pacific Corporation, Masco Corporation, Nashua Corp., Nucor Inc., 
Oregon Steel Mills Inc.., Owens Illinois Inc., PPG Industries Inc., Quanex Corporation, Sherwin Williams Co., 
Sonoco Producs Co., Terex Corporation., Toro Company, United States Steel Corporation, Weyerhaeuser Co. 
199
 These entities were selected on the basis of information on the Federal Trade Commission website and 
Westlaw searches.
200
 These entities were selected on the basis of press releases and articles located through searches using 
Google.
201
 These entities were selected on the basis of their access to, collection and possible leveraging of protected 
categories of data as an integral part of their business – children’s data, financial data, and health data.
202
 These entities were selected on the basis of being manufacturing entities whose primary products do not 
relate to information technology.
203
  This scale was created by the author and consists of a scaled score of 0-8 which was tabulated by awarding 
one point for presence of each of the following possible disclosures: disclosure of a specific incident, disclosure of 
risks of government prosecution or civil suit arising out of privacy and security breaches, disclosure of risks of 
negative publicity from a security breach driving down stock price, disclosure of risks of malware, disclosure of 
risks of hacking, disclosure of risks of costs associated with industry custom changes, disclosure of risk of 
compliance costs and potential liability associated with additional regulation in the area of privacy and security, 
disclosure of other sources of other sources of vulnerability or costs associated with information security.  
Cronbach’s Alpha was computed at .66 with 120 cases for the 2 items using the scale.
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In this inquiry, the independent variables are technology business, business novelty, 
number of employees, data prosecution history, vulnerability history, data intensive business,
and level of disclosure at Time 1.
i.  Technology Business
Technology business refers to whether each entity in the sample is primarily an entity 
manufacturing or servicing information technology. It was operationalized as a dichotomous 
variable.
ii.  Business Novelty
Business novelty refers the comparatively newness of each corporate entity in the sample.  
It is operationalized as a continuous variable between 1900 and 2000, referring to the year the 
entity was first incorporated.  
iii.  Number of Employees
Number of employees refers to the number of employees most recently reported as 
employees of each entity in the sample.204  It was operationalized as a continuous variable.
iv.  Data Prosecution History
Data prosecution history refers to the presence or absence of a history of Federal Trade 
Commission actions against the entity for its handling of data security and a history of being 
named as a defendant in civil class action suits against the entity for data security related harms.  
It was operationalized as a dichotomous variable.
v.  Data Vulnerability History
Data vulnerability history refers to the presence or absence of a history of publicized 
security breaches.  It was operationalized as a dichotomous variable.
vi. Data Intensive Business
Data intensive refers to whether the primary business of the entity is contingent on 
aggregation, storage, leveraging or transportation of personally identifiable consumer data.  It 
was operationalized as a dichotomous variable.
vii.  Level of Disclosure at Time 1
Level of disclosure at Time 1 refers to the score of each entity in the sample on the 
Information Security Securities Disclosure Scale in its 10K filing from 1999.
204
  This information was collected from several sources including corporate websites and securities filings.
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5. Methodology
Each 10K filing at Time 1 and 2 was analyzed in terms of security vulnerability 
disclosure on the basis of the Information Security Securities Disclosure Scale,205 and the
“demographic” information about each entity for the variables of technology business, business 
novelty, number of employees, and data intensive business was obtained either from an entity’s 
securities filings or from the entity’s corporate website.  Information regarding prosecution 
history was obtained from the FTC website and Westlaw. Data vulnerability history was
obtained through Google. The resulting data was standardized and multiple regressions were 
performed.  Multiple regression analysis was selected for analyzing the data collected in this 
study because multiple regression analysis is a particularly potent m ethod of quantitative analysis 
that facilitates identification of trends across many cases.  In particular, multiple regression 
provides the ability to disentangle the separate effects of independent variables while 
simultaneously assessing their correlation with one another.206 Ideally, the results obtained from 
this study will be replicated on a much larger scale.  Thus, the goal is to identify tendencies 
present in individual publicly traded entities that will be generalizable to populations larger than 
the current population.    
6. Results and Analysis
Overall, less than a half of the 120 entities in the sample engaged in any information 
security disclosures at Time 2. Therefore, widespread discussion of information security risks 
with shareholders is not occurring. Results of regression analyses are discussed below and are 
presented in Table A.
The question asked by Hypothesis 1, whether entities in the technology sector would be 
more likely to engage in security disclosure at Time 2 that entities whose primary business is not 
205
 Each of the 240 10K filings was reviewed by two raters, with an interrater reliability result of 94.6%..
206
 Multiple regression analysis and quantitative analysis generally have been critiqued as producing results 
which lack meaningful detail amidst expansive generality.  Because a large number of cases are typically used in 
quantitative analyses, the particular dynamics of subsets of cases and particular cases are missing from the analysis.  
Similarly, the parsimony of variables that is valued in quantitative analyses has a cost: by explaining as much as 
possible with as few variables as possible, still more nuances of cases may be missing from the analysis. Charles C. 
Ragin, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL RESEARCH, 132-135 (1994).  Regression is a sufficiently powerful analytical tool to 
withstand a skewed sample.  See, e.g., Gerard E. Dallal, Transformations in Linear Regression, available at 
http://www.tufts.edu/~gdallal/regtrans.htm (last visited January 17, 2005). Knowledge of general patterns regarding 
the information security disclosure practices of entities in this study may allow regulators to more effectively 
address the information security crisis.  Because of the goals of this study, multiple regression analysis was an 
appropriate choice for analysis of the data.
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technology related, was answered positively. A regression analysis with disclosure at Time 2 as 
the dependant variable and technology companies as the independent variable yielded a
significant difference in disclosure level at Time 2 at the .01 level of significance.  Disclosure 
levels of technology entities in the sample were .50 of a standard deviation more positive than 
the disclosure levels of nontechnology entities. 
Hypothesis 2 questioned whether newer entities tended to demonstrate higher levels of 
information security disclosure at Time 2.  This question was answered positively.  The results 
obtained through performing regression analysis with disclosure level at Time 2 as the dependant 
variable and novelty as the independent variable and were statistically significant at the .01 level.    
For each increase of one standard deviation in novelty of the entity, disclosure at Time 2 
increased .32 of a standard deviation.
Hypothesis 3 presented the question whether a greater number of employees tends to   
coincide with increased disclosure levels at Time 2.  The results of regressing disclosure level at 
Time 2 as dependant variable and the number of employees as the independent variable at Time 
2 generated significant results at the .10 level.  However, counterintuitively, the greater the 
number of employees the lower the level of disclosure of an entity tends to be.  For each 
increase of one standard deviation in number of employees, the level of security disclosure of an 
entity at Time 2 decreased  by -.15 of a standard deviation.
Hypothesis 4 asked whether presence of a history of prosecution influences the extent of 
security disclosure at Time 2.  Results of a regression with disclosure at Time 2 as the dependant 
variable and a history of prosecution as the independent variable generated revealed a positive 
impact of a history of prosecution on disclosure at Time 2 in the sample.  Results were 
significant at the .01 level and showed that entities with a history of prosecution tended to 
demonstrated disclosure levels at Time 2 that tended to be .29 of a standard deviation higher than 
entities without a history of prosecution.
Hypothesis 5 examined the influence of a history of information vulnerability on entities’ 
disclosure practices at Time 2.   Running a regression with disclosure level at Time 2 as the 
dependant variable and vulnerability history as the independent variable yielded a positive 
influence of vulnerability history on disclosure level.  Disclosure at Time 2 of entities in the 
sample who were known to have a history of information vulnerability reflected levels that 
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tended to be .29 of a standard deviation higher than the levels of entities without vulnerability 
history. This result was significant at the .01 level.
The question asked by Hypothesis 6, whether entities with data intensive businesses at 
Time 2 are more likely to engage in vulnerability disclosure than entities that are not data 
intensive was answered positively.  A statistically significant difference was found between the 
disclosure practices of entities with data intensive businesses and those of entities that do not 
operate inherently data intensive businesses at the .01 level. Data intensive entities’ disclosure 
levels were .29 standard deviations more positive than the disclosure levels of entities that did 
not have data intensive businesses in the sample.
Hypothesis 7 explored the impact of an entities’ vulnerability disclosure at Time 1 as a 
predictor of the entities’ disclosure level at Time 2.  To wit, a series of three regressions was run 
with varying results.  First, a regression with disclosure level at Time 2 as the dependant variable 
and as the independent variables, whether the entity was a technology company, the novelty of 
the company, the number of employees, and the data intensive nature of the business, controlling 
for disclosure level at Time 1.  Technology entities tended to reflect a .28 of a standard deviation 
higher disclosure score than nontechnology entities in the sample at Time 2, a result significant 
at the .01 level.  Disclosure at Time 1 demonstrated a change of .39 of a standard deviation in 
disclosure at Time 2 for each change of one standard deviation of disclosure at Time 1. 
Meanwhile, controlling for novelty of the entity, number of employees, and the data intensive 
nature of the business of each entity in the sample yielded results that were not significant at the 
.15 level.
Second, a regression was run with disclosure at Time 2 as the dependant variable and 
data prosecution history and vulnerability history as the independent variables, controlling for 
disclosure at Time 1.  Disclosure at Time 1 generated results significant at the .01 level of 
significance, with entities’ tending to have a .50 of a standard deviation more positive disclosure 
at Time 2 in connection with a change of one standard deviation in disclosure at Time 1. No 
statistically significant result was found in connection with a history of prosecution or 
vulnerability at the .15 level of significance.  
Finally, the “demographic” variables (technology entity, novelty, number of employees, 
data intensive business) were combined with the data history variables (prosecution history and 
vulnerability history) into one regression.  A decrease of the effect of a one standard deviation 
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change in disclosure at Time 1 resulted. Now a change of one standard deviation in disclosure at 
Time 1 was associated with a .36 of a standard deviation change in disclosure at Time 2, a result 
significant at the .01 level.  Prosecution history now increased in significance: a history of 
prosecution was associated with .15 of one standard deviation increased disclosure at Time 2, 
significant at the .10 level. Finally, a slight increase occurred for technology companies, which 
were now associated with disclosure levels at Time 2, which were .29 of a standard deviation 
higher that levels of nontechnology companies.  This result was significant at the .01 level.  This 
last regression explained 39% of the variation in the dependent variable, a good fit.
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7. Conclusion
Based on the results of the above regressions, it appears that the entities in the sample 
that engaged in disclosure at Time 2 tended to consist of technology companies, entities that had 
been prosecuted for data vulnerability and entities with a history of disclosing security practices.  
a.  Corporate information security learning is not emerging across sectors in 
the economy
Based on the existence of data privacy and security regulation, it would have been 
expected that the data intensive nature of a business would coincide with higher levels of 
disclosure at Time 2, regardless of their prior disclosure practices.  However, this was found not 
to be the case.  Data intensive entities are not discussing the security risks they face and, 
therefore, tend not to create a feedback loop for external assessment of their data security 
processes and risks through disclosure.  They appear to be adopting a paradigm of “security 
through obscurity.” Instead, what appears to be happening is that entities with greater in-house 
technological expertise, technology companies, are apparently more attune to the risks of 
information security and are disclosing accordingly.  The difference in security disclosure levels
between technology and nontechnology entities in the sample can be in part explained by looking 
again to the theorertical concepts of first and second order change207 and to the technology 
learning processes described in Section I(B).  First order change refers to learning how to do new 
things, while second order change refers to learning how to learn in new ways.  An entity’s
collection and leveraging of data extensively in its business reflects first order change: the entity 
has learned to do something new as a consequence of the enabling power of technology.  
However, understanding information security and creating processes for addressing security 
within an entity reflects a second order change.  Because of their industry, it can be presumed 
that technology entities on average start from a higher level of institutional technology 
knowledge than nontechnology entities.  As such, while nontechnology entities are still 
developing in the first order stages of technology learning, technology entities can be presumed 
to have progressed into the second order stage already. Therefore, they may have a better 
understanding and mastery of controlling, leveraging and protecting information assets and the 
security around them.
207 GREGEORY BATESON, STEPS TO ECOLOGY OF THE MIND, 50 (1972).
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b.  Corporate information security learning is not emerging across time and 
a paradigm of “security through obscurity” is prevalent
The companies in the sample who have historically disclosed security risks at Time 1 
tended to continue to do so at Time 2, but apparently few additional companies are joining their
ranks.  This result tends to indicate that corporate security learning is not emerging in most 
entities across time.  Alternatively, it could be argued that perhaps security learning may be 
emerging in nontechnology entities but is simply not disclosed.  This would again imply that 
entities have consciously adopted the suboptimal paradigm of “security through obscurity.”
Particularly when coupled with the PwC Study finding that advances in security are usually only 
in response to regulation and fear of liability, it can be argued that the most likely corporate 
information security learning is unlikely to be emerging.  A majority of the sample has adopted
the “security through obscurity” paradigm.  Particularly in the case of nontechnology entities, it 
is likely that entities do not understand the severity or the long term implications of the 
information security risks they face.  Consequently, it is also likely they are choosing the get the 
public relations benefits of making privacy promises and simply accepting the relatively low risk 
of prosecution. 
c.  Corporate information security learning appears to emerge in response to 
external threat of legal audit and sanction
The final significant result is that companies who have been prosecuted tend to engage in 
greater disclosure.  It appears from the results of both the empirical inquiry in this article and the 
PwC Study that entities invest greater resources in information security as a result of legal threat 
and not out of negative experiences with information vulnerability themselves.  In the inquiry 
conducted in this section, entities prosecuted for data breaches engaged in better security 
disclosures than entities without a prosecution history.  Meanwhile, entities with a history of 
vulnerability but without a prosecution history did not engage in better disclosure.  Therefore, 
results seem to indicate that it is legal action which encourages self-assessment and disclosure.  
These results may appear to advocate greatly increasing frequency of prosecution for data 
security breaches.   Although additional prosecutions may ultimately result in greater disclosure, 
fiscal realities of agency budgets make this suggestion a limited one in practice in the short term.
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Prosecution takes years in some instances, years during which the information security crisis will 
undoubtedly exponentially worsen.   Prosecution also carries with it heavy administrative and 
legal costs not only for the prosecuting agency but also the entity being prosecuted, money which 
is perhaps better allocated by the entity to improving security rather than defending regulatory 
action or civil suit.  Similarly, the study described in this section did not evidence any clear
“transitive” effects of prosecution – the entities disclosing information security risks tended to be 
the entities prosecuted themselves and not entities whose data intensive business models gave 
them reason to worry about vulnerability.
d.  The most promising approach to improving information security is one which 
scaffolds emergence of corporate information security learning
The most promising approach for improving the security of information throughout the 
economy as quickly as possible rests in generating process-based feedback loops to allow for 
efficient assessment of entity conduct by regulators, marketmakers, shareholders and consumers.  
Similarly, facilitating transitivity of good information security behaviors presents a critical part
of adopting a “security through process” paradigm.  Moving toward more secure systems is an 
ongoing process of learning to respond to ever-changing internal and external threats to security.  
A critical component is learning to address information risk through, among other things,
disclosure of failures and external assessment.  This process does not appear to be meaningfully 
occurring in the entities in this sample.
The next section presents one possible means for leveraging existing securities regulation 
to generate feedback loops of disclosure of corporate information security behaviors.  These 
feedback loops will result in three changes:  (1) movement toward the information security and 
cryptography paradigm of “security through process” using securities law, (2) facilitating 
increased transparency of information for shareholders and marketmakers, and (3) scaffolding 
corporate learning of good security behaviors, which will be transferred onward to business 
partners and, in time, may trickle down to consumers.
III. Creating an Autocatalytic Set of Information Security Processes
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
60
This section proposes one method of moving toward improving the state of corporate 
information security in our economy through creating a legal autocatalytic set208 of good 
corporate information security behaviors. 209 This approach is predicated on the information 
security and cryptography paradigm of “security through process,” and informed by insights 
from complexity theory210 about information transitivity in scale-free networks such as our 
economy.  Finally, the approach set forth in this section creates feedback loops reflecting the 
cybernetic elements of communication, control and system.211 Specifically, this section argues 
for adding line item disclosure requirements to Regulation S-K relating to information security 
and ensuring the certification procedures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act include security auditing 
and analysis.  Working to remedy the problem of information vulnerability in the economy falls 
squarely within the three-fold mission of the SEC – preservation of market stability, facilitation 
of capital creation, and investor protection.  Securities laws provide an existing mechanism for 
encouraging emergence of good information security behaviors in the “hub” entities of our 
economy, publicly traded entities.  Leveraging existing successful regulatory frameworks and 
208
 An autocatalytic set is a group of elements working together to generate a product that itself becomes the 
stimulus for the reaction which generates the next generation product.  For a discussion of autocatalysis, see, e.g., 
STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995).
209
 For a discussion of the legal implications of information security, see, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A
Criminal Law for Cyberspace Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1  (2004)(arguing that the only 
successful approach to security is through a distributed security model); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing 
Legal Standard for Information Security, 796 PLI/PAT 465 (2004)(setting forth the scope of prosecutions for 
computer security by federal agencies to date and providing business advice about structuring corporate security 
processes); Michael Rustad, Thomas Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003)(arguing tort law has failed to keep pace with online fraud and security issues);  Ethan 
Preston,  John Lofton, Computer Security Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability and the First 
Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71 (2002)(arguing that crafting a good liability regime for security publications 
must involve weighing not only the negative consequences of disclosure of a vulnerability but also the positive 
impact of preventing future exploitation of the vulnerability because of patching behaviors in response to its 
disclosure); Gary M. Schober,  Shubha Ghosh, Ann Bartow, Chris Hoofnagle, Phyllis Borzi, Colloquium on Privacy 
and Security, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 703  (2002) (discussing the social impact of evolving technology on data control);  
Dean William Harvey, Amy White, The Impact of Computer Security Regulation on American Companies, 8 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 505 (2002)(discussing the current state of corporate information security law in the U.S.); 
Michael Rustad, Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213 
(1995)(arguing that the internet could quickly “veer into the highway to Hell” where “malefactors may cause a firm 
to unwittingly disclose its prime *216 information commodities.”).   
210
 Complexity theory has been applied to analyze regulatory and social evolution in the context of 
environmental preservation and similarly presents a useful analytical lens for the present inquiry in Section III.  For 
applications of complexity theory to environmental contexts see, e.g., Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity 
Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of 
Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE 
ENVTL. L.& POL’Y F. 161 (1999); Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex 
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996).
211 See note 13 supra
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legal mechanisms provides a more efficient approach than starting over through new data control 
legislation.
A. Crafting Legal Autocatalytic Sets 
When scientists speak of “autocatalytic sets,” they refer to collections of elements where the 
product of the initial reaction of combining the elements will act as a catalyst for the creation of 
other reactions of the set.  In other words, the product and reactions of the set of elements will be 
able to self-sustain.212 It is this type of reaction chain which effective legal regulation initiates.  
An effective legal regime will generate an autocatalytic set that commences the process of 
legal emergence of norms, behaviors and structures that enable continued economic growth, 
what I have called elsewhere “architectures of growth.”213 A change in corporate security 
behavior, though initially instigated in response to law, can become a self-sustaining, 
autocatalytic set of good information security behaviors.  In other words, the product of legal 
compliance will itself stimulate better information security behaviors in the future.
It is this type of autocatalytic set of information security behaviors which the following 
section attempts to introduce.  The narrow additions to securities law proposed in the next 
section attempt to assist entities in implementing a paradigm of “security through process”
within their operations in a self-sustaining manner.  Entities will also become more sensitive to 
the dangers their business partners pose to information security compromise. Consequently, 
entities will begin to contractually require good security behaviors from them, another self-
sustaining mechanism for virally spreading good security behaviors through the system.  
Simultaneously, the proposals below begin to introduce greater transparency into information 
security behaviors of corporate entities to assist shareholders and marketmakers in receiving
accurate information regarding corporate security practices – information that should be reflected 
in stock price, generating another self-sustaining mechanism for monitoring care in corporate 
information security.  Finally, perhaps the last self-sustaining behaviors may arise from positive 
externalities of entities’ educating their employees in handling corporate information in a careful 
manner.  Some of these lessons of good security practices may be transferable to these 
212 See Kauffman note 221 supra.
213 See Matwyshyn note 201 supra.  Architectures of growth are emergent legal constructions that facilitate 
commercial development. 
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employees’ own consumer security behaviors and practices outside the workplace or may at least 
raise consumers’ awareness of information security threats.
B. Feedback Loops through Cybernetics and Securities Law
Autocatalytic sets usually involve creation of critical feedback loops. In order to allow 
systems to develop in a manner which improves performance, three elements comprising 
feedback loops are necessary – communication, control and system. 
1. Communication
Adequate communication for building an information security feedback loop within our 
economy must start with finding the weakest points in the network.  To accomplish this, enough 
security information must be available to enable identification of particularly vulnerable “hub” 
entities in our economy.  Requiring that entities keep track of and analyze their annual losses 
arising out of various types of information security breaches will instigate a process of more 
careful information security monitoring.  This process of data security loss analysis will help 
entities understand their own weaknesses and will allow for identification of entities whose 
information security practices seem to lack improvement and disproportionately burden the 
system. Specifically, this section argues for improving “communication” by using existing 
securities laws214 to mandate line item disclosure of  information security losses through, for 
example, expanded Items 103(legal proceedings), 303(MD&A),  and 308(internal controls) of 
Regulation SK.   Similarly, leveraging Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, certification of 
audit procedures and financial statements should demonstrably consider issues of information 
security.  
a.  Creating Feedback and Transparency:  Regulation S-K 215 and 
Sarbox
Although Congress is increasingly allocating attention to data control legislation,216 it 
appears that entities and consumers217 have not yet grasped the importance of information 
214
  For a discussion of the evolution of securities laws in response to technology see, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, 
Regulatory Initiatives and the Internet: A New Era of Oversight for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 33 (2001-2).
215 REG. S-K, 17 CFR §229.101 available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/regsk.htm#des (last 
visited February 24, 2005).
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security.  Business entities underestimate the severity of financial losses that result directly and 
indirectly from weak information security practices.  As demonstrated by the empirical inquiry in 
Section II, entities tend not to consider the information risks they face to be “material” or 
detrimental to their financial integrity.218 Part of the reason for this knowledge deficit may 
pertain to the absence of feedback loops relating to information security in the system.  
One manner of creating a feedback loop, which appeared to be effective in the empirical 
inquiry in Section II, is through litigation.  In theory, a feedback loop could be judicially created 
through deeming information security disclosures to be a “material” disclosure that all publicly 
traded entities should be including in their disclosure statement.   Unfortunately, however,
relying on courts to craft such a doctrine of “materiality” that encompasses disclosures of 
information security information will be a quixotic course of action.  The materiality standard 
has been a hopeless morass of disparate caselaw for decades.219
216
 Outside of the United States, governments are also paying attention to information security issues.  The 
approach to data privacy adopted by the United States is less stringent than that adopted by the member states of 
European Union and Canada. See e.g., Gant Goss, Spam Agreement between U.S. and E.U. May be on the Way, 
ITWORLD, July 17, 2003, available at http://www.itworld.com/Man/2695/030717spamagreement/ (last visited 
February 28, 2005).
217
 But see Richard Trinkner with Brian Smith, Consumer Technology Adoption Roadmap,  available at 
http://www.gartnerg2.com/site/FileStream.asp?SID=0&File=wp-0902-0002.pdf (discussing quickening pace of 
consumer adoption of technology)(last visited February 28, 2005).
218
 As part of 10K annual reports, public entities are required to disclose all “material” events in the life of the 
business that may impact a shareholder’s investment in the entity.  The definition of materiality, however, is in flux 
and much discretion regarding whether an event is “material” for disclosure purposes remains with the company 
engaging in the disclosures.  For a discussion of materiality see e.g., Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept 
of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661 (2004); Patrick Hall, The Plight 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in the Post-Enron Era: The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of 
Materiality in Employer-Teamster v. America West, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (2004); Hugh Beck, Determining the 
Materiality of Earnings Forecasts under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in Helwig v. Vencor, 2002 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 111 (2002); Nicholas Kappas, A Question of Materiality: Why the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Regulation Fair Disclosure is Unconstitutionally Vague, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 651 (1990); John 
M. Newman, Jr. Mark Herrmann Geoffrey J. Ritts, Basic Truths:  The Implication sof the Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory for Evaluating the “Misleading” and “Materiality” Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571 
(1995); Alan J. Rubenstein, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson: Materilaity of Preliminary Merger Negotiations and the 
Presumption of Reliance under Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 2 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 331 (1990).
219
 Materiality has been defined differently in different securities law contexts by courts. In some instances a 
“probability-magnitude” test is applied by courts.  See, e.g., Basic v. Levenson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  Materiality is 
determined by whether the magnitude of the potential loss is so great that even a remote risk required disclosure or 
provides basis for actions for fraud under Section 10b5. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 867 
(CA2 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).   The SEC then adopted this same standard of materiality 
in an SEC Enforcement Release and 1988 SEC interpretive release for MD&A disclosures.  See In the Matter of 
American Savings and Loan Association of Florida, Exch. Act. Rel. No. 25788 (June 8, 1988); Exch. Act. Rel. No. 
25951 (Aug. 2, 1988).  Then, in a 1989 MD&A release the SEC explicitly stated that MD&A materiality standards 
differ from those adopted in Texas Gulf Sulpher.  This 1989 Release instructed management to make two 
assessments to determine materiality: (1) whether the particular trend, event or uncertainty is reasonably likely to 
happen and (2) if management cannot determine the likelihood of occurrence, then evaluate the contingency on the 
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Therefore, a more promising method of generating a feedback loop is through adding a new 
line item disclosure requirement or expanding existing line item disclosures in Regulation S-K.  
Regulation S-K sets for the requirements forth information entities must disclose in their 
quarterly 10Q and annual 10K filings.220   Specifically, at least three sections lend themselves to 
expansion with additional information security specific disclosure requirements: Items 103, 303,
and 308.
i. Regulation S-K, Items 103 - Legal Proceedings
 Item 103 requires that entities disclose “material pending legal proceedings other than 
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business,”221 and, in particular must disclose any 
proceeding which relates to a discharge of materials into the environment where a governmental 
authority is a party and the entity believes that monetary sanctions resulting will be more than 
$100,000.222  Just as this special carveout was created by the SEC for environmental losses,223 a 
new special carveout can be created for information security losses.  However, because of the 
unique nature of information security harms, information security related regulatory action 
should be carved out absolutely from the definition of “ordinary routine litigation” in Item 103.  
The harms of information vulnerability, unlike a toxic landfill, are not geographically localized 
and containable; information, once obtained, can be resold and used by numerous individuals 
concurrently to cause harm.  A breach of security which carries a small regulatory fine may 
occasion systemic damage and corporate losses far in excess of the amount of the fine. More 
assumption that it will happen. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 26831 (May 18, 1989)
An altogether different definition appears in insider trading contexts. Information is material for purposes of 
creating the basis of an insider trading action if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important" in deciding how to act. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  In 
the long term, the materiality standard for disclosure should be doctrinally reconciled in favor of a reasonable 
investor standard that dovetails with standards of “reasonableness” in other areas of law, particularly tort law.  For a 
discussion of reasonableness standards in tort and securities law.  For a discussion of the historical evolution of 
consumer protection standards and tort law, see, e.g., MARSHALL SHAPO, PAGE KEATON, PRODUCTS & THE 
CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRACTICES (1972).; MARSHALL SHAPO, PAGE KEATON, PRODUCTS & THE CONSUMER: 
DEFECTIVE & DANGEROUS  PRODUCTS (1970).  Information security negligence claims will result in a construction 
of “reasonable” security practices, “reasonable” corporate conduct in contracting, and “reasonable” users.  In the 
interim while awaiting such a doctrinal movement, the Securities and Exchange Commission can work to educate 
both businesses and investors about the importance of information security through mandating particularized 
disclosure.
220
 17 CFR  229.1 et seq. 
221
 17 CFR 229.103 
222
 Instructions to 17 CFR 229.103
223 See note 248 infra
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importantly, if an entity is so vulnerable that a regulatory agency is willing to allocate resources 
to its prosecution, this entity should be flagged in the market as weakly protecting its intangible 
assets generally.  Information vulnerability within an entity is rarely a localized problem; it 
generally indicates a problem of inadequate security throughout the entity. Similarly, any class 
action litigation related to information security, particularly information security negligence, 
should be disclosed and not deemed litigation in the ordinary course of business.
ii. Regulation S-K, Item 303 -  Management Discussion and Analysis 
(“MD&A”)
One of the central requirements of Form 10K is the section entitled Management 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations or “MD&A.” 224 The 
goal of this section is to enable investors to analyze the financial health, culture, goals and 
identity of the corporation through the eyes of management.  Therefore, the section is intended to 
include discussion of trends, unusual or important events and corporate risks that are reasonably 
likely to materially impact the company. 225 MD&A disclosures226 complement "risk factor" 
disclosure in registration statements under the 1933 Securities Act and form an increasingly 
integral part of periodic reporting under the 1934 Exchange Act.227 Most recently, the passage of 
224
 Requirements are set forth in Item 303 of Regulation S-K. "The MD&A requirements are intended to 
provide, in one section of a filing, material historical and prospective textual disclosure enabling investors and other 
users to assess the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant, with particular emphasis on the 
registrant's prospects for the future." Release No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989).  Regulation S-K, Item 303(a) sets forth 
the general MD&A requirements applicable to full fiscal years. It states that: "[t]he discussion shall provide 
information as specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this Item and shall also provide such other information 
that the registrant believes to be necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial 
condition and results of operations."  See also MD&A proposal and 2003 MD&A Guidance at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8098.htm (emphasizing that MD&A "should not be merely a recitation of the 
financial statements in narrative form or an otherwise uninformative series of technical responses to MD&A 
requirements, neither of which provides the important management perspective called for by MD&A" and 
emphasizing that MD&A also requires "analysis" as well as "discussion."). 
225 Item 303(a)(3) requires disclosure of "known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant 
reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact" on future income. 
226
 "The Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation of the financial statements, 
because a numerical presentation and brief accompanying footnotes alone may be insufficient for an investor to 
judge the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance. MD&A is 
intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management by providing 
both a short and long-term analysis of the business of the company. The Item asks management to discuss the 
dynamics of the business and to analyze the financials." Release No. 33-6711 (Apr. 24, 1987). 
227 Id. at 654
Andrea M. Matwyshyn
66
Sarbanes-Oxley (“Sarbox”) and new rules promulgated under it also enlarged the scope of the 
discussion required in MD&A.228
Item 303 can be expanded to include a paragraph (a)(6) which specifically addresses 
information security strategy and failures that have or are reasonably likely to have a current or 
future effect on a company’s financial condition, revenues or expenses,229 particularly intangible 
assets protected principally through trade secret law.230  This new requirement can be crafted to 
mirror the recent addition of paragraph (a)(4) to Item 303, which directly addresses off-balance 
sheet arrangements and was added on January 27, 2003 in the wake of the Enron collapse.231
Particularly in light of the SEC’s recent movement to make filings more readily analyzable with 
software applications,232 a new disclosure requirement would enable monitoring of entities with 
weak information security.  If these initiatives to require that companies file periodic filings in 
machine-readable format succeed, analysis of security behaviors over time would be an easily 
228
  Also, in December 2003, the SEC issued Release 34-48960 regarding preparation of MD&A. In this manner 
and through enforcement actions, the SEC is signaling its increased attention to MD&A compliance. SEC 
pronouncements on MD&A and qualitative disclosure have included the following: 1980 - SEC adopts present 
disclosure requirements for MD&A (Release 33- 6231); 1981 - SEC issues staff interpretive guidance for MD&A 
(Release 33- 6349); 1987 - Public comment sought on adequacy of MD&A and on proposed revisions (Release 33-
6711); 1989 - SEC issues staff interpretive release MD&A (Release 33- 6835); 1999 - Segment Information -
Release No. 33-7620, which adopted technical amendments to conform the reporting requirements with FAS No. 
131 so that narrative disclosure in reports must relate to each operating segment when segment financial reporting is 
required; 2001 -  Release 33-8040 discusses a review of Fortune 500 annual reports results in comment letters, many 
of which commented on MD&A to more than 350 of these companies. Cautionary advice is issued encouraging 
companies to include in MD&A full explanations of their "critical accounting policies." ; 2002 - SEC issues 
interpretive guidance for MD&A (Release 33- 8056) and SEC proposes additional MD&A disclosure requirements 
for critical accounting estimates (Release 33-8098); 2003 - Additional MD&A disclosure requirements adopted for 
off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual obligations (Release 33-8182) and SEC issues guidance on MD&A 
(Release 33-8350).
229
 Setting forth a minimum dollar amount in the line item may be a prudent idea to avoid a portion of the 
conflicts that plague the evolution of materiality doctrine.  One approach for setting this minimum dollar amount 
may be to track the levels specified in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act  18 U.S.C. 1030 regarding what level of 
damages must be shown to bring a prosecution.  
230
 Employees are a primary source of trade secret and information security compromise. See, e.g., Jane 
Howard-Martin, Companies, Employees Fight for Trade Secrets, USA TODAY, December 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/jobcenter/workplace/employmentlaw/2002-12-18-trade-secrets_x.htm  (last visited 
February 24, 2005). Frequently an initial line of defense to an allegation against a former employee of stealing trade 
secrets is demonstrating that adequate information control practices were not in place in an entity and hence, 
material in question was not a trade secret. 
231 See Release No. 33-8182 Recently added paragraph (a)(5) requiring disclosure of contractual obligations 
could be also be expanded to include as a required disclosure category contracts that involve the number of parties 
with which the entity shares consumer personally identifiable information. Release No. 33-8182 Through this 
addition of contractual consumer datasharing category, networks of data sharing can be mapped and the sources of 
information vulnerability more readily realized, a important capability because any vulnerability in the information 
system negatively impacts the system as a whole and entities unrelated to the initial data leakage.  
232 See Exchanging Commission Data Through Tagged Files, Concept Release, at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-8497.htm (last visited February 24, 2005).
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accomplished task with the assistance of software.   Therefore, mapping the most vulnerable 
points among the hubs of our information economy will be an easily surmountable task that will 
save U.S. corporations billions in the aggregate in information security related losses annually.
Also, just as in the context of disclosure under Item 303 with regard to compliance with 
Federal, State and local provisions regulating discharge of materials in the environment,233
entities should report the extent of capital expenditures they were forced to undergo or will be 
forced to undergo for the remainder of the current fiscal year and the succeeding fiscal year, or 
such longer period the registrant deems relevant, to comply with new privacy and security 
legislation.  Through reporting these numbers, the cost effectiveness of various new legal 
approaches to data control can be more easily. Reporting of these expenses  also provides the 
entity a benefit in litigation; it generates an easily produced record of efforts at exercising “due 
care” in maintaining information security.  This record of care can become critical evidence for 
defense in information security negligence actions.
iii. Regulation S-K, Item 308 - Internal Controls
The frameworks used by entities to assess integrity of financial reporting should consider 
information security and integrity as part of their structure.  Item 308 of Regulation S-K requires 
that management provide a report on internal controls over financial reporting, including
identifying the framework used for analysis of effectiveness of controls and an attestation 
regarding level of efficacy of existing internal controls. Item 308 (a)(3), which already requires 
that management must disclose any material weakness in internal controls over financial 
reporting,234 can be expanded to specifically carve out information security breaches as one of 
233
 Item 303 (xii) states that “Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that 
compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of 
materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, may have upon the capital 
expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose 
any material estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal 
year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods as the registrant may deem material.”  But see
Request for Rulemaking for Clarification of Material Disclosures With Respect to Financially Significant 
Environmental Liabilities and Compliance with Existing Material Financial Disclosures, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-463.htm (last visited February 24, 2005)(discussing confusion in the 
environmental materiality standards) and Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Clarification of Material Disclosures 
With Respect to Financially Significant Environmental Liabilities and Compliance with Existing Material Financial 
Disclosures available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-463.shtml  (last visited February 24, 2005).  For a 
discussion of environmental disclosure requirements under securities laws, see, e.g., Richard M. Shwartz, Donna 
Mussio, Environmental Disclosure Requirements under the Federal Securities Laws, 1424 PLI/CORP 333 (2004)
234
 17 CFR 229. 308(a)(4), Item 308(a)(4)
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the types of material weakness that must be disclosed under this item. In particular, information 
security audits such as SAS 70 audits235 should be a regular part of operations assessment 
required to be noted under 308(a)(2) as a means of assessment of current internal controls. If an
entity experiences repeated data vulnerabilities, particularly serious intrusions by third parties 
into the entities information systems, it is possible that the integrity of the entity’s financial 
auditing processes have been corrupted and attestation of integrity may be improper.  Similarly, 
an entity must consider the extent of the diminished value of compromised data and its impact on 
reporting of intangible asset value on financial statements.
iv. Sarbox, Section 404 – Officer Certification of Internal Controls 
Sarbox in particular addresses accuracy of audit processes and security of corporate 
information of publicly traded entities in particular through Section 404. Section 404 requires 
that entities establish adequate internal controls and auditing procedures236 certified by 
management237 regarding the financial statements of the entity.238  Consequently, information 
security is reflected in two ways in Sarbox.  First, entities are required to establish information 
security processes and audit procedures to protect against information vulnerability.  Secondly, 
entities must accurately reflect the diminished value of any intangible assets compromised as a 
result of information security breaches on their financial statements.   In other words, 
information regarding the value of intangible assets, which includes both consumer information 
as well as trade secret information, must be accurately reported.  If the data has been 
compromised, the reported value must reflect this negative change in value, just as discussed
above in the context of Item 308 of Regulation S-K.  
Because Section 302 of Sarbox specifically authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules 
regarding officers’ responsibility to certify the accuracy of financial statements and auditing 
235
 SAS 70 audits pertain to an in-depth audit of a service organization’s control activities, which generally 
include an inspection of controls over information technology and other security processes. See About SAS70 at 
http://www.sas70.com/about.htm (last visited February 24, 2005).
236
 For example, one auditing procedure that specifically relates to information security is an SAS70 audit.  Id. 
237
 Section 302 authorized the SEC to promulgate rules regarding officers’ responsibility to certify the accuracy 
of financial statements and auditing procedures.  See Final Rule, Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly 
and Annual Reports, 17 CFR 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270 and 274, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8124.htm  (last visited February 24, 2005).
238 107 P.L. 204, Section 404
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process,239 the SEC is authorized to promulgate a rule specific to information security reporting 
and certification in connection with Section 404 of Sarbox.  As part of this new certification rule 
regarding information security, the SEC should require attestation that any providers and 
business partners (and the partners of those partners, down the entire length of the chain of data 
transfer) receiving data from the entity are under contractual obligations to maintain security of 
the data shared in accordance with law and privacy promised otherwise made by the entity to 
consumers.  Thus, truthful attestation of data control imposes an obligation on publicly traded 
entities to require care in information security both from themselves and from all other 
subsequent entities that touch an entity’s data. 
b. Creating Transitivity of Good Information Security Behaviors
As described above, additional information security disclosure requirements under 
securities laws will facilitate greater transparency in corporate information security behaviors on 
an ongoing basis.  In this manner, it will bring about a shift in the regulatory paradigm to 
“security through process.”  Additional disclosure requirements will also assist in disseminating 
good security throughout the system; they will create transitive effects and viral spread of good 
information security behaviors throughout the transitive closure of the public company or “hub”
and onward throughout the system.  
As previously discussed, data risk within the transitive closure of the hub is assumed by 
the hub; a breach at any point in the data sharing chain impacts the hub. Therefore, public 
entities are responsible for not only the integrity of their information and internal operations but 
also those of even remotely connected nodes in their transitive closure. Thus, an explicit 
requirement that public entities must certify the information security practices of all entities 
within their transitive closure ensures both greater information integrity and greater transitivity 
of good information security behaviors.  A hub can contractually insulated itself by creating a 
group of nodes directly and indirectly around it that contractually demonstrate certain minimum 
levels of data care. In other words, public entities that engage third parties to provide services in 
data processing, storage, conveyance or leveraging of corporate information will be required to 
239 See Final Rules, 17 CFR 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270 and 274, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8124.htm
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contractually impose on these business partners both a duty to maintain basic levels of 
information security and a duty to ensure security in onward transfer.  
Through contractual imposition of good security behavior obligations on all entities 
within the transitive closure of the publicly traded entity, the system will quickly disseminate 
improved information security norms.    In this manner, nodes doing business with a hub will 
improve information security practices within their entities to maintain the business relationship 
with the hub and, in turn, require their business partners to do likewise.   These improved 
security behaviors may then become standard practice throughout the system and set a new 
business norm.
2. Control
In the context of the new communication mechanisms proposed in this section, two principle 
control benefits will result.  First, these additional disclosures will better allow shareholders of an 
entity to overcome the agency problem often discussed by corporate law scholars,240 enabling
better shareholder oversight of corporate activity.  Similarly, marketmakers will receive better 
access to information about information security breaches in order to ensure that corporate 
information vulnerability, security losses and diminution of intangible asset value are being 
factored into stock price of vulnerable entities.  This information may not currently be reaching 
marketmakers in a timely manner.
Through requiring additional disclosure, part of the collective action problem inherent in 
corporate information security investment will be remedied.  Currently, one of the business 
drivers that keeps some entities from investing in security is the unwillingness to be the first-
mover in raising security standards; if competitors are not investing in security, it may seem 
imprudent or extravagant to do so.   However, a uniform disclosure requirement, would reframe 
the decision, changing good security from a luxury to an essential business expense that must be 
240 See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 2-5 
(1935). For a discussion of Berle and Means, see WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BERLE & MEANS RECONSIDERED AT THE 
CENTURY'S TURN, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001). See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, WILLIAM H. MECKLING, THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: MANGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE in ROBERTA ROMANO (ED.) 
FOUNADATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 7 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 671, 672 (1995) (noting that modern scholars refer to the Berle and Means problem as an 
agency problem). See also, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1931) (arguing that corporations exists exclusively to make profits for the shareholders).
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incurred by all entities.  This new corporate focus on better security, in turn, will result in long 
term value creation for the entities themselves both directly and indirectly.
a.  Eliminating the corporate agency problem with regard to information security 
losses and strengthening shareholder control over corporate information security
One of the key elements of the paradigm of “security through process” is expecting that
third parties will be able to find vulnerabilities in an entity’s information security systems.  In 
this manner, external accountability is layered onto an entity’s internal accountability processes 
for vulnerabilities. In other words, control over security becomes shared between the entity and 
the imagined community241 of its external security auditors.242 As a consequence, vulnerabilities 
are taken more seriously and cannot be ignored in the way that a paradigm of “security through 
obscurity” allows.  
This structure mirrors the mechanisms of shareholder control in a corporation. In a 
corporation, one of the initial and most important sources of external auditing is shareholder 
scrutiny.  Corporate law theory frequently contemplates issues of the agency problem of 
shareholders’ suboptimal inclusion in the decisionmaking processes of the entities they own.243
Because of this agency problem, shareholders can be limited in the information they receive and 
are, consequently, unable to act as a check on corrupt or adverse actions of officers and directors.  
Management of an entity should craft information security strategy in a manner that 
expects that shareholders will be watching every decision.  Moving toward eliminating this
agency problem in the context of corporate information security will improve accountability to 
shareholders for corporate losses resulting from information vulnerabilities. The improved 
disclosures described in Section III(A) will allow for even shareholders not knowledgeable in 
information security to track entities’ progress (or lack thereof) in information control.  Perhaps 
241
 For a discussion of “imagined communities” see BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983).
242
 For an example of norms developing in the whitehat hacker/security researcher community with regard to 
reporting security vulnerabilities, see Rain Forest Puppy, Full Disclosure Policy (RFPolicy 2.0) available at 
http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html (last visited November 30, 2004). For discussion of the benefits and costs of 
including whitehats and blackhats in monitoring see, e.g., Michelle Delio, Bug Finders: Should They Be Paid?, 
WIRED, August 9, 2002, available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,54450,00.html (last visited 
November 30, 2004); Brent Wible, A Site Where Hackers Are Welcome: Using Hack-In Contests to Shape 
Preferences and Deter Computer Crime, 112 YALE L.J. 1577 (2003).  
243
 For a discussion of the corporate decisionmaking and problems related to proxy solicitation see, e.g., Mark J. 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder 
Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003).
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even more importantly, the additional proposed disclosures will eliminate an existing 
information disparity between the shareholders of an entity and third parties more knowledgeable 
about information security -- the small group of hackers and information security professionals 
who scour the pages of information security industry publications for identities of vulnerable 
entities.  Currently, these third parties know more about the information security practices of 
entities than most of the entities’ shareholders. Through additional disclosures, shareholders will 
receive information that enables them to decide whether to sell their shares or communicate
concerns to management regarding the entity’s information security strategy.
b.  Holding vulnerable entities accountable in the market and diminishing share 
price
Additional information security disclosures will also assist marketmakers in exerting 
control over the vulnerable; marketmakers are in a position to hold entities accountable for 
inferior information security practices by punishing through lowered stock price, provided they 
know about the information breaches.  Incorporating information security disclosures into a 
document that marketmakers are sure to read such as a 10K will ensure that marketmakers know 
of breaches.  Consequently, they will be poised to react to the diminished intangible asset value 
of entities that have suffered repeated security compromise.
In at least two recent cases of severe information security breaches tracking share price of 
the entities raises doubts whether the diminution of intangible asset value that resulted from the 
security breaches was properly incorporated by the market. These two case studies of recent 
information vulnerabilities are (1) the theft of the AOL customer list by a corporate insider and 
its sale to a spammer244 and (2) the penetration of Acxiom, Inc.’s database of personally 
identifiable consumer information by a hacker.245  In both of these cases, the severity of the 
breach of information and the nature of the information breached is estimated to have resulted in 
millions of dollars in long run losses for both entities.  In light of these losses, in accordance with 
244
  Information regarding this theft was not publicly known until the arrest of the alleged perpetrator on June 
23, 2004. See Bob Sullivan, AOL Customer List Stolen, Sold to Spammer, MSNBC, June 24, 2004,  available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5279826/ (last visited November 30, 2004).  See also United States Attorney, 
Southern District of New York, U.S. Announces Arrests in Case Involving Scheme to Steal AOL Customer List and 
Sell it to Spammers, June 23, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/JUNE04/AOL%20Complaint%20PR.pdf  (last visited October 
29, 2004).
245 Id. 
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the efficient market hypothesis,246 one would have expected that the stock price would decline to 
reflect the diminished commercial value of a critical corporate asset, but even several days after 
the market knew of the compromise, stock price did not decline in either case.  
i. AOL customer list sale to a spammer 
On June 23, 2004, a former AOL employee was charged with stealing the provider's 
entire subscriber list of 37 million consumers and over 90 million screen names, credit card 
information, telephone numbers, and zip codes and selling it to a spammer who leveraged and 
resold the information.247  AOL had not previously acknowledged the data breach and 
knowledge of the breach was not widely possessed until the charges were brought on June 23, 
2004. The customer list of AOL was a critical intangible corporate asset of AOL whose value 
was contingent on its secrecy.248  Therefore, it would be logical for the market price of shares of 
AOL’s corporate parent, Time-Warner, Inc. to reflect a dip in value because of the incident and 
the corresponding probably diminution of a critical business asset’s value.  However, the share 
price on June 23 closed up and continued to increase for several days. In other words, it appears 
that the market price may not have reflected an immediate change in share price as a 
consequence of a significant asset value diminution, as seen in Figure A below.  It is possible 
that the share price corrected for this diminution later in the month, but it is also possible that the 
information simply never caught the attention of marketmakers and was not accurately filtered 
into share price.
Figure A.  Closing Stock price of Time-Warner Inc. – June 1, 2004 to August 1, 2004
246 See note 256 infra.. 
247
 The software engineer who stole the data did not have immediate access to it himself, he was able to obtain 
the information through impersonating another employee. Although the initial sale price of the list is unknown, the 
spammer paid $100,000 for a second sale of updated information with 18 million additional screen names.247  The 
list was then resold to a second spammer for $32,000 and leveraged by the first spammer in his internet gambling 
business and sent mass marketing emails regarding herbal penile enlargement pills to AOL members. United States 
Attorney, Southern District of New York, U.S. Announces Arrests in Case Involving Scheme to Steal AOL 
Customer List and Sell it to Spammers, June 23, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/JUNE04/AOL%20Complaint%20PR.pdf  (last visited October 
29, 2004); United States of American v. Jason Smathers and Sean Dunnaway,  S.D. NY  available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cyberlaw/ussmthrs604acmp.pdf (last visited February 25, 2005).
248
  Customer lists are considered a corporate asset and sometimes protectable under state level trade secret law, 
which varies from state to state in its scope.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bagnall, Privacy, SJ095 ALI-ABA 209 (2004)
(“Although the value of a customer list may be difficult to estimate, it is clear that it may be a substantial asset.”).
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ii. Hacker penetrations of Acxiom’s consumer information 
databases249
Acxiom Corp. is a data aggregation company that sells aggregated consumer information 
to customers such as credit reporting agencies, banks, and the Department of Homeland Security. 
250 On August 8, 2003, after the market closed for the day, Acxiom Corp. issued a press release 
that a significant breach of its databases had occurred. Several hundred thousand consumers’ 
249 See e.g., Caryn Rousseau, Hacker accesses customer information from database manager Acxiom, 
SECURITYFOCUS, August 7, 2003, available at http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6665 (last visited February 25, 
2005) ; Jay Lyman, Acxiom Database Hack Highlights Risk, TECHNEWSWORLD, August 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/31306.html (last visited February 25, 2005);  Peggy Harris, Six in Axciom 
hacking case reach agreement with prosecutor, USATODAY, July 23, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2004-07-23-six-for-Acxiom_x.htm (last visited February 25, 
2005); Robert O'Harrow Jr., Advertiser Charged in Massive Database Theft, SECURITYFOCUS, July 22, 2004, 
available at http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9189 (last visited February 25, 2005); Associated Press, Prominent 
database company hacked again, Florida man arrested for huge theft of personal data, MSNBC, July 21, 2004, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5481403/(last visited February 25, 2005); 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2004-07-22-Acxiom-hack-charges_x.htm (last visited 
February 25, 2005); John Leyden, Spammer charged in huge Acxiom personal data theft, THE REGISTER, July 22, 
2004, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/22/acxiom_hack_charges/ (last visited February 25, 2005); 
Laura Rohde,  Florida hacker indicted in big online theft case, COMPUTER WORLD, July 22, 2004,  available at 
http://computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,94673,00.html (last visited February 25, 2005).
250
 The Department of Homeland Security is one of Acxiom‘s customers.  See e.g., Jill D. Rhodes, CAPPS II: 
Red Light, Green Light, or ‘Mother, May I?’ available at 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/displayarticle.asp?article=107 (last visited February 25, 2005).
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information was compromised in this breach; the information included social security numbers, 
credit card numbers, and telephone numbers.251
Acxiom’s prime assets are the intangible assets which were compromised in this breach.  
Consequently one would expect that the value of Acxiom’s shares would be diminished because 
of the diminution in value of the entity’s prime assets. However, although the extent of 
information breached was known to the market, Acxiom’s share price did not decrease in the 
days immediately after news of the data penetration became known to the market.  In fact, 
Acxiom’s closing share price increased steadily after August 8, 2003 for several days, as shown 
in Figure B.
Figure B.  Closing Stock Price of Acxiom Corp. – August 1, 2003 to October 1, 2003
Ultimately, two possible explanations are possible for the share price appearing not to 
demonstrate a downward shift – either the vulnerable data had no market value and the stock 
price is correct without adjustment or the vulnerable data had market value and the market failed 
251
 U.S. attorneys estimate the attack cost Acxiom $7 million, primarily from business lost or delayed and 
Acxiom has a history of data penetrations, which have previously cost the company millions of dollars, according to 
U.S. attorneys’ estimates made in December.  See, e.g., Alleged Acxiom Hacker Indicted, available at 
http://www.4law.co.il/arkan1.htm (last visited February 25, 2005).
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to adjust.  Customer lists and data are an asset with increasing marginal returns in the short 
run;252 after the initial costs of information acquisition, subsequent copies of the information cost 
almost nothing to “produce.”253   We know the “street” value of millions of AOL customers’ 
information on the information black market 254was over $100,000 and we can presume the value 
in the legitimate information marketplace is significantly higher, most likely over $2,000,000.255
However, in both the AOL and Acxiom breaches, the stock market appears to have failed to 
acknowledge this diminished intangible asset value, and neither entities’ stock price appears to 
have been detrimentally impacted in the short term because of these data vulnerabilities.  
Assuming the compromised data had monetary value, the market may, therefore, reflect an 
inefficiency – a failure to adjust downward to reflect the lower value of a key asset of each 
entity.  Thus, the market may not be compensating for weak information disclosure by 
incorporating the available information security breach information from available sources into 
stock price.256
252
  In the long run, however, companies frequently take depreciate losses on them.  See note 40 supra.  But, in 
all instances, they are generally viewed as a key corporate intangible asset with significant value.
253
 For a discussion of increasing marginal returns. See, e.g., BRIAN W. ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND 
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994).
254
 Information black markets are increasing in size and scope.  For example, outside of stolen client lists, one 
can purchase credit card numbers, zero day exploits and malware of various ilk.  See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Rampant 
trade of stolen credit-card numbers shows lack of security, NEW YORK TIMES, May. 12, 2002, available at 
www.nytimes.com (last visited October 29, 2004).
255
  For example, the value of the 250,000 customer list of a bankrupt online retailer was deemed to be worth at 
least $50,000. See, e.g., Gavin McCormick, Settlement Reached in Toysmart List Case, CLICKZNEWS, January 12, 
2001, available at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/559231 (last visited February 25, 2005). 
256
  Doubt is yet again cast on the efficient market hypothesis.  Fama asserted a market is efficient if there are 
large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers competing to predict future market values of securities with 
information being almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, actual prices of individual 
securities already accurately reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and 
which will take place in the future. In other words, an efficient market’s actual price of a security will be a good 
estimate of its intrinsic value.  See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 
December 1991. But see, e.g., Andrew K. Rose, Olivier Jeanne, Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=348200 (last visited February 25, 2005).  In fact, 
what we know from complexity theory is that the most efficient systems are not those where information is perfectly 
incorporated but rather systems with some noise. See, e.g., Wouter-Jan Rappel and Alain Karma, Noise-Induced 
Coherence in Neural Networks, available at http://physics.ucsd.edu/~rappel/pub/coherence.pdf (last visited 
February 25, 2005). The explanation adopted here is that the nature of information security information is currently 
too complex for most investors and analysts to be able to understand and incorporate into their investment decisions. 
A market failure to absorb complicated information security information into stock price might be paralleled with 
the inability of the market to absorb information about the complex legal issues involving environmental damage, 
which resulted in the SEC’s addition of line item disclosures to Regulation S-K previously, and the questionable 
nature of Enron’s transactions.  Even as copious information about the dubious nature of Enron’s activities was 
available to marketmakers, Enron’s share price continued to climb.  See, e.g., Lawrence Evans, Enron and Chaos, 
available at http://www.ecotao.com/holism/add/enron/Enron_chaos.html (last visited March 15, 2005).  Markets do 
not exist in equilibrium; they strive for equilibrium but frequently fail.
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The explanation may be very simple: vulnerability information may simply not be 
catching the attention of marketmakers or these financial professionals, who are usually not 
information security professionals, may not yet understand the long-run financial implications of 
corporate information vulnerability.  The field of information security is a relatively esoteric and 
new field, which did not gain prominence until the information technology revolution of the late 
1990’s.   It is unreasonable to expect that marketmakers have the time or knowledge to scour the 
pages of SecurityFocus257 on a daily basis to incorporate information about security breaches 
into their calculations of appropriate market price of entity’s shares. Marketmakers need 
information in a usable format to which they are accustomed.  The additional information 
security disclosures to annual filings proposed in this Section III provide one such usable format.
3. System
With regard to the final element of system, three systemic benefits will result from this 
exercise of additional control arising out of new communication.  First, market stability will be 
bolstered in a manner consistent with prior practice, disrupting the existing system little. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission would help create a system to address the information 
security crisis by using existing regulatory structures and following its own model from the 
previous regulatory policy challenge of improving corporate environmental practices. Secondly, 
publicly-traded entities themselves will benefit through being encouraged to put in place more 
systematic processes of information control and self-assessment.  Focusing on improving 
information security practices will assist entities in protecting proprietary information and
creating value in the long run. Finally, a last systemic benefit may happen through the employees 
of entities.  Entities will begin to train their employees in rudimentary information security and 
the importance of data control.  Ideally, these behaviors, once implemented throughout 
organizations by employees, will be accompanied with the positive externality of employees’
transferring good information security behaviors into their personal behaviors as well. 
Consequently, the portion of information vulnerability in our economy resulting from suboptimal 
consumer security behaviors may be reduced.
257
  For example, Security Focus recently broke the story of the leakage of 500,000 credit card numbers by a 
vulnerability is the PetCo, Inc. website.  See Kevin Poulsen, Petco Settle with FTC over Cybersecurity Gaffe, 
SECURITYFOCUS, November 17, 2004,  available at http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9957 (last visited 
November 30, 2004).
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a. Bolstering Market Stability:  Using Existing Structures of Securities Law
The idea of crafting more data privacy and security legislation is an idea proposed 
frequently as the best approach to improve the information security crisis faced by our society.258
However, prior to investing additional Congressional resources into drafting new statutes and 
generating entirely new data control regimes that will potentially disrupt existing corporate and 
legal structures, we should first exhaust the capabilities of existing legal regimes in alleviating 
the information security crisis.  The securities law approaches proposed in this article hold 
promise as methods of improving corporate information security practices without the upheaval 
and protracted process required by crafting new legislation.  The speed of information security 
evolution requires a more nimble approach that a regulatory body such as the SEC with faster 
response times than Congress is better suited to provide.  
Similarly, the mark of a good corporate legal regime is one which effectuates socially 
necessary changes in corporate behavior without overburdening entities through excessive new 
legislation, what Professor Ribstein might term “humble” regulation.259  Put another way, a well-
crafted legal intervention into corporate behavior will dovetail compliance with new legal 
requirements with an entity’s existing processes of enterprise risk management planning and 
compliance processes. Consequently, a new legal regime should attempt to use compliance 
mechanisms that will be incorporated as seamlessly as possible into the life of a business entity 
while simultaneously furthering the social purposes that necessitate the legal intervention.  In this 
258 See Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to Critical 
Infrastructure in a Networked World, 58 BUS.LAW.349(2002) (advocating Congressional intervention into 
commercial data security through new legislation requiring corporate disclosure of actual cyberintrusions and 
measurable damages) . For a general discussion of legal implications of commercial data security see, e.g., Wendy 
Meyer, Insurance Coverage for Potential Liability Arising From Internet Privacy Issues, 28 J. CORP. 
L.335(2003)(arguing that in light of new internet liabilities, insurers must create new policies to create such 
liabilities, particularly for gathering of private information through the internet);  Thomas J. Smendinghoff, The 
Developing U.S. Legal Standard for Cybersecurity, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 109(2003)(arguing corporate security law is 
emerging and requires constant vigilance by business entities); Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”:  Making 
the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 4(2002-3)(arguing that the market in personal information demonstrates market failure and that a 
public opinion campaign should be mounted to find a solution to problems associated with data mining tools); 
Stephen E. Henderson, Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 
N.M.L.REV.11 (2002)(arguing for adoption of traditional negligence law principles in the context of information 
security); Michael Rustad, Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH.L.J. 
213(1995)(arguing proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code is a legal framework ideally suited for 
resolving legal issues which arise in connection with internet security products).
259
 Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279.
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manner, society moves toward an economic system where consumer protection is harmonized 
with assisting entities pursue long term economic gains for shareholders.
Perhaps most convincingly, precedent for improving corporate information security using 
securities law already exists: our society faced a similar problem almost a decade ago in the 
context of environmental liabilities.  Congress has legislatively highlighted the social importance 
of information security in a manner similar to the way Congress highlighted the social 
importance of environmental protection in the 1980’s with the passage of CERCLA260 and other 
environmental legislation.261 In the 1980’s, the SEC worked to implement the Congressional 
directive of better corporate environmental practices by correcting a similar disclosure and 
possible market adjustment failure; the SEC required increased corporate disclosure of potential 
environmental liability in the MD&A section of securities filings. 262
b. Facilitating Corporate Value Creation:  Building Effective Enterprise Risk 
Management Processes
Because the threat of regulation and liability appears to be the strongest motivating factor 
for corporate security improvements,263 a line item disclosure requirement will motivate 
corporate entities to focus corporate resources on information security. However, as mentioned 
previously, investments in information security by entities have clear long run benefits for the 
entity itself.  Better security results in public relations benefits,264 including maintaining 
customer satisfaction and preventing customer churn, preservation of differentiating intellectual 
property and competitive advantage, positioning the entity to demonstrate due care with trade 
260
 The Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601 et 
seq., known as "CERCLA" or the "Superfund" law, is the principal federal law governing the cleanup of pollutants 
and the remediation of polluted sites.
261 See Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (summarizing CERCLA's congressional legislative 
history).  See also Fifth Annual Symposium on the topic of "Disclosures of Environmental Liability in SEC Filings, 
Financial Statements, and Debt Instruments, Opening Remarks of the Panelists, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 293 (1994). 
262
 The addition of a line-item environmental disclosure requirement by the SEC was necessitated in part due to 
doctrinal confusion in standards of “materiality” for MD&A disclosure.  This doctrinal uncertainty has remained 
unresolved and, hence, we face a similar problem in a different policy context now.   However, the information 
security crisis cannot wait for this doctrinal resolution of the materiality standard. 
263 PwC Study note 111 supra.
264
 Breaches of data security frequently bring with them bad publicity.  For example, Oracle recently suffered a 
public relations debacle when its allegedly “unbreakable” database technology was penetrated. Avoiding such bad 
publicity preserves the goodwill of an entity and having processes in place to manage the incident and its 
consequences reflects good management.  See, e.g., Thomas C Greene, How to hack unbreakable Oracle servers,  
THE REGISTER, February 7, 2002, available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/02/07/how_to_hack_unbreakable_oracle/ (last visited February 25, 2005).
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secrets to a court,265 avoiding breach of privacy policy promises to users, avoiding liability 
associated with regulatory agency prosecution and positioning the entity to demonstrate due care 
to a court to avoid liability in connection with emerging information security negligence 
caselaw.266  Similarly, instituting strong information control assists entities in knowledge 
management267 to be able to harness information resources more easily for corporate ends.  As a 
consequence of prudent information security risk management planning, information security 
will no longer be viewed as exclusively the province of information technology departments of 
corporations but, rather, the joint responsibility of all employees of the entity; information 
security is an enterprise-wide undertaking.  Raising institutional awareness through securities 
law will bring new groups of corporate management into the information security strategy 
process.  Entities will begin to recognize the information transformation they have undergone in 
the last decade, as well as the increased importance of information systems in their operations.  
Information regarding information breaches will be shared more widely within entities and their 
importance more carefully assessed.
Secondly, the mere act of completing securities disclosure forms frequently acts as a 
catalyst for corporate officers to sit down with their in-house and outside counsel to collect and 
assess information they will be providing to the market.  Securities filings with particular 
disclosure requirements can be viewed as a reminder to management of key sources of liability 
for entities. Particular line item disclosures on information security will ensure that these 
decisionmakers spend time at least once a year reviewing their entities’ information security 
policies and losses. This assessment that may not currently be occurring even once a year.
c.  Consumer Protection:  Consumer Information Security Behavior Learning 
through Employees
265
 If an entity has experienced significant data compromise and does not take action to improve its security, 
demonstrating to a court in the case of trade secret litigation that corporate proprietary information has been kept 
secret with due care becomes more difficult.  As receiving trade secret protection for a particular intangible asset is 
contingent on this demonstration of care and secrecy, entities will benefit in the long run from crafting stronger 
information security management practices and building processes to review their efficacy on an annual basis.  
266
 Although the initial wave of information security negligence suits is in its nascence, it is slowly developing.  
See note 191 supra. 
267
 For a discussion of the definition of knowledge management  see, e.g., Megan  Santosus, Jon Surmacz, 
ABC’s of Knowledge Management, CIO, available at http://www.cio.com/research/knowledge/edit/kmabcs.html
(last visited February 25, 2005).
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Finally, because corporate information security is an entity-wide enterprise, a critical 
mass of employees in each entity will progressively become trained and sensitized to protecting
the corporate proprietary information.  Some of the good corporate information security practices 
these employees learn may be applicable outside the workplace to their handling of their own 
sensitive personal information. Consequently, a positive externality may result:  some good 
security practices of employees in the workplace may be transferred by these employees into 
good information security practices in their lives outside of work.    Correspondingly, a portion 
of the consumer information vulnerability problem may begin to decrease.  For example, the 
entities in the sample in Section III employed 3,458,544 people.  If even half of these individuals 
become more informed consumers, improve their personal practices with regard to information 
security or teach family and friends about information security because of training they received 
for the benefit of their employers, progress toward alleviating the information security crisis is 
likely.  
V. Conclusion
In this article I have argued that our society exists in a state of information security crisis. 
Congress’ attempts to date to address this crisis adopt the largely discredited cryptography and 
security paradigm of “security through obscurity.”  They do not focus on analyzing and 
addressing information security problems in the economy as a whole, and, therefore, are not 
destined to stem the information security crisis we currently face.  A better regulatory approach 
is one that adopts concepts articulated by Kerckhoff’s Law, that of “security through process.” It 
also adopts lessons from complexity and cybernetics theory about information transfer in a scale-
free system, particularly regarding the importance of constructing feedback loops and 
contemplating network properties of risk and behavioral transitivity. Similarly, an empirical 
examination of information security disclosure practices of 120 publicly traded entities 
demonstrated that correcting the regulatory approach is necessary because the conduct of a vast 
majority of these entities also reflects a paradigm of “security through obscurity.”  Therefore, 
security learning is unlikely to emerge in the marketplace without legal intervention and 
assistance.
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As such, the SEC should now follow its own example from the environmental disclosure 
context and replicate it in the information security context:  the SEC should again remedy 
disclosure and possible market adjustment failure through creating additional line item disclosure 
requirements that implement the Congressional directive of better corporate information security 
practices.  As such, because the harms of information crime are shared by business, government 
and consumers, a paradigm of “security through obscurity” does not acknowledge these shared 
consequences of security failures.  Meanwhile, a process-based approach addresses these issues 
of shared control in a superior manner. Requiring line item information security disclosures will 
help increase awareness of the information vulnerability crisis our society faces and scaffold 
learning of better information security practices for both corporations and consumers. Security is 
ultimately not only about one entity’s or one consumer’s proprietary information; it is also about 
protecting the good of the social information ecology as a whole and stemming information 
harms to better enable commerce and innovation.  
